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SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS, CAFA, AND A
COUNTRYWIDE CRISIS: A CALL FOR CLARITY
AND CONSISTENCY
Denise Mazzeo *
The unfolding of the credit crisis raises novel issues in securities
litigation. This Note explores the conflict between the nonremoval
provision of the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act) and the removal provisions
of the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (CAFA), and their interplay in the
context of class actions involving mortgage-backed securities. Circuits are
currently split over whether or not such class actions are removable under
CAFA. The Seventh Circuit and the Southern District of New York have
held that class actions asserting only '33 Act claims are removable under
CAFA unless they fall within one of CAFA's exceptions, while the Ninth
Circuit has found that the '33 Act's nonremoval provision trumps CAFA.
This Note unpacks the historical purposes and legislative histories of CAFA
and the federal securities laws, and examines them under the lens of the
current financial crisis. The Note argues that the Seventh Circuit
interpretation is superior because it gives effect to all of CAFA's
provisions, as well as the historical purposes of the '33 Act. CAFA applies
to all class actions, including securities class actions, but not to individual
securities actions. Individual securities actions are not removable under
the '33 Act, thus giving effect to the nonremoval provision and its historical
purposes of providing investor protection. While looking to the past is
instructive, courts should consider the present situation. Though they are
not traded on a national exchange, mortgage-backed securities are
currently at the heart of the countrywide credit crisis. To that end, this
Note proposes that the approach with the most clarity and consistency is to
allow for removal to federal courts of securities cases that are of real
national importance.
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INTRODUCTION
"Only a foolish optimist can deny the dark realities of the moment ....
Practices of the unscrupulous money changers stand indicted in the court of
public opinion, rejected by the hearts and minds of men."1  Seventy-five
years after these remarks were first uttered in President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt's (FDR) 1933 Inaugural Address, they seem prescient as the
country finds itself in a familiar predicament. The financial crisis that
began with the foundering of the housing market and subprime mortgages
has already been hailed as "the most significant financial crisis since the
Great Depression." 2 And yet, remarkably, in almost the same breath, there
is a sense of optimism: "we have the policy mechanisms in place fighting
it, which is something we didn't have during the Great Depression." 3 Yet
as the crisis unfolds and the global economy continues to endure the effects
of the subprime debacle, we are confronted with troubling questions: With
the aforementioned policies in place and seventy-five years of history under
1. Franklin D. Roosevelt, U.S. President, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1933),
available at http://www.archives.gov/education/lessons/fdr-inauguralU#documents.
2. S. REP. No. 111-1, at 2 (2009) (statement of Sen. Schumer, Chairman, Joint Econ.
Comm.); see also Jon Hilsenrath et al., Worst Crisis Since '30s, with No End Yet in Sight,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at Al.
3. Hilsenrath et al., supra note 2.
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our belt, how is it that we have found ourselves in another financial crisis? 4
Are these the statements of a "foolish optimist," 5 or are these policies still
effective? 6
These policy mechanisms began with the first federal securities
legislation: the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act). 7 The first federal
securities laws were enacted at the behest of FDR. In the wake of the Crash
of 1929, investor protection was of utmost importance, and the '33 Act was
enacted within mere weeks of FDR's inauguration. 8 Overall, the '33 Act
was designed to afford broad remedies for defrauded investors. 9 One such
protection the '33 Act afforded, inter alia, was a private right of action.10
Indeed, the '33 Act not only allowed plaintiffs to choose whether to bring
suit in state or federal court by providing for concurrent jurisdiction, but
Congress took a rare step in the pro-plaintiff direction by inserting a
nonremoval provision into the Act, thereby preventing defendants from
removing cases brought under the '33 Act to federal court.11  Nonremoval
4. "[T]he nagging question remain[s] of how such an old problem could resurface after
70 years despite the Securities Act of 1933, written and amended over the years to prevent
such abuses." CHARLES R. GEISST, WALL STREET: A HISTORY: FROM ITS BEGINNINGS TO THE
FALL OF ENRON 388 (2004).
5. Roosevelt, supra note 1.
6. See GEISST, supra note 4, at ix-x ("After the 1930s, it was thought, incorrectly, that
scandals in which investors were bilked of billions of dollars and many financial institutions
seriously compromised would not occur again .... [T]he assumption remained
fundamentally intact until 2001 [with the fall of Enron]. Events developing since that time
only prove that the centuries-old conflict between Washington and Wall Street will
continue.").
7. Securities Act of 1933, ch. 38, 48 Stat. 74 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§
77a-77aa (2006)).
8. See GEISST, supra note 4, at 228 (noting that the Securities Act of 1933 ('33 Act)
was passed within weeks of President Franklin D. Roosevelt's taking office, but the drafting
had actually begun during the interregnum; indeed, during "the first few weeks of the new
administration, final drafting on the proposed legislation was furious"); id. at 227
("[B]anking and securities legislation was the first item on the new administration's
agenda ... ").
9. See id. at 229 ("The Securities Act did not actually control the behavior of bankers;
instead, it was meant to protect investors from fraudulent new securities offerings."); id. at
388 (noting that the '33 Act was written and amended over the years to prevent abuses of
small investors). Even Justice William 0. Douglas, who argued in the 1930s that the '33 Act
was a political statement rather than effective protection for investors, at least acknowledged
that such investor protections are-and should be-the fundamental purpose of the federal
securities laws. See William 0. Douglas, Protecting the Investor, 23 YALE REV. 521, 521-22
(1934) [hereinafter Douglas, Protecting the Investor] (suggesting that "the Act is significant
politically" and "symbolic of a shift of political power" but that it lacks "deep insight into
the requirements for protection of investors" and thus falls short of its purpose); William 0.
Douglas & George E. Bates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE L.J. 171, 173
(1933) (noting that certain flaws in the '33 Act "detract attention from the fundamental
purpose of the Act-protection of investors").
10. Securities Act of 1933 § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (providing for civil liabilities on
account of false registration statements).
11. Securities Act of 1933 § 22(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (providing that cases brought in
state court under the '33 Act may not be removed to federal court).
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provisions are rare exceptions, rather than the rule. 12 The general removal
statute provides, "Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of
Congress, any civil action brought in a State court of which the district
courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by
the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place where such action is
pending."' 13 By contrast, section 22(a) of the '33 Act, the antiremoval
provision, states, "Except as provided in section 77p(c) of this title, no case
arising under this subchapter and brought in any State court of competent
jurisdiction shall be removed to any court of the United States."'14 Despite
ample opportunity to do so, this antiremoval provision has been largely
untouched for almost three-quarters of a century. 15
History serves as a reminder that investor protection seems to ebb and
flow with the market. 16 In times of economic troubles and bear markets,
investor protection generally increases; 17 in times of prosperity and bull
markets, Congress seems to be less concerned with protecting investors,
and more so with deregulating and preventing litigious abuses of the
system.18 Historically, in order to change the tide from bear market to bull,
12. In some rare instances, an Act of Congress proscribes removability for various
reasons. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1445 (2006) (listing certain types of nonremovable actions).
13. See id § 1441(a); see also S. REP. No. 109-14, at 9 (2005), reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 10 ("The concept of 'removing' cases from state courts to federal courts is
based largely on the same core premise as diversity jurisdiction-i.e., that an out-of-state
defendant in a state court proceeding should have access to an even-handed federal forum.").
14. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a).
15. See Thomas Lee Hazen, Allocation of Jurisdiction Between the State and Federal
Courts for Private Remedies Under the Federal Securities Laws, 60 N.C. L. REv. 707, 741
(1982) ("[D]espite numerous opportunities to correct any oversight, more than forty years
have elapsed without alteration of these provisions."); infra notes 75-78 and accompanying
text.
16. "The swings in political ideology that caused Wall Street and the banks to be
regulated and then deregulated decades later provide a good microcosm of American history
in the twentieth century." CHARLES R. GEISST, UNDUE INFLUENCE: How THE WALL STREET
ELITE PUT THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM AT RISK 288 (2005). For an overview of how Wall
Street's history traces the ebb and flow of investor protection, see id. passim; see also
GEISST, supra note 4.
17. See, e.g., GEISST, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that in the wake of the 1929 Wall Street
scandals, "[i]nvestor protection became the new watchword" during the 1934 New Deal
legislation); id. at 6 (from the time securities legislation was passed in 1933, "the public
demanded to be protected from investment bankers, who became public enemy number one
during the 1930s"); id. at 399-400 (discussing how the massive Enron fraud caused the
investing public to distrust corporate America and Wall Street in the wake of that debacle,
just as it had in the 1930s, and thus beckoned protective regulation in the form of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act); id. at 400-01 (arguing that the unraveling of the markets in the 1990s
was due to legislation that favored deregulation, as opposed to investor-protecting
regulations).
18. See, e.g., id. at 274 (discussing the parallels between the unprecedented prosperity of
the bull markets of the 1920s and 1950s, including "aggressive stock promoters, corporate
expansion, and a generally favorable regulatory attitude"); id at 5 (noting that as Wall Street
embraces an economies-of-scale attitude in order to expand, "the old protections are quickly
falling by the wayside in favor of integrating all sorts of banking activities under one roof');
id. at 371 (discussing the 1990s-the greatest bull market in history-a decade marked by
1436 [Vol. 78
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investor confidence has been the key. 19 Although the purpose of '33 Act
was to restore confidence in the national markets by providing broad
protections for defrauded investors, 20 some of those protections were
whittled away during the 1990s-a period characterized by economic
prosperity. 2 1 Indeed, in 1995, Senators Paul Sarbanes, Barbara Boxer, and
Richard Bryan were so confident as to state that "our markets today are the
largest and most vibrant in the world. This is so not in spite of the Federal
securities laws, but in part because of [them]. '22 This statement coincided
with the beginning of a series of securities reforms characterized by
receding investor protections-beginning with the enactment of the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA). 23 The PSLRA made it
more difficult for plaintiffs to bring securities class action lawsuits in
federal court. The PSLRA was followed by the enactment of the Securities
Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA), which sought to plug
up one major loophole left open by the PSLRA: bringing securities class
actions in state courts to avoid the procedural hurdles of federal court.24
SLUSA amended the nonremoval provision of the '33 Act by adding
section 77p(c), which carves out an exception from the nonremoval
provision for class actions involving covered securities, or securities sold on
deregulation under Chairman of the Federal Reserve Alan Greenspan, who coined it the
"decade of irrational exuberance"); id. at 388 (describing small investors during the
prosperous 1990s as "'lambs' . . . being led to slaughter while believing that they were
protected by securities laws," and noting that proving that small investors have been
defrauded or misled is even more difficult than usual during a bull market, when the focus is
on expanding the markets).
19. Id. at 276 ("Part of the reason [that the federal securities laws of the 1930s were
finally accepted by Wall Street] could be attributed to investor confidence. A boom was
coming, and it was clear that if the new investor of the 1950s was to be drawn to
investments, he would have to feel comfortable in the markets."). Moreover, when the
decline of the late 1960s brought a "wave of change" to Wall Street, the federal securities
laws were "recognized as bringing more stability to the markets than they ever experienced
before," as investors now felt safer. Id. at 298-99.
20. See supra note 9 and accompanying text.
21. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 37 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 715
(discussing the strength of the U.S. capital markets in the early 1990s).
By every measure, the United States capital markets are the largest and
strongest in the world.... [F]or 1993, U.S. equity market capitalization stood at
$5.2 trillion, over one-third of the world total. The U.S. markets continue to
grow ....
The growth of trading on our exchanges is a sign of the strength of our markets.
Average daily trading volume on the New York Stock Exchange increased from
44.9 million shares in 1980, to 156.8 million shares in 1990, to 291.4 million
shares in 1994. The NASDAQ and American Stock Exchanges have experienced
similar gains in trading volume.
Id. (footnotes omitted); see also GEISST, supra note 4, at 371 (the prosperous 1990s were
known as the decade of "irrational exuberance" due to the unprecedented expansion of the
capital markets).
22. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 37, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 715.
23. Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
24. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
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a national exchange. 25  The stated rationale for expanding removal
jurisdiction for these securities was to create a "uniform national approach"
to securities litigation involving securities that are important in the national
market, i.e., "nationally-traded" (covered) securities. 26
While SLUSA's scope was limited to securities class actions, Congress
applied the same rationale to class actions in general in 2005 by enacting
the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). 27 CAFA amended the requirements
for diversity jurisdiction by establishing original jurisdiction in the federal
courts for large, costly class actions-that is, those exceeding $5,000,000 in
controversy, and in which any one plaintiff is diverse from at least one
defendant-because such class actions are more likely to be nationally
important. 28 CAFA also provided for such class actions to be removable to
federal court,29 creating a potential conflict with the nonremoval provision
of the '33 Act.30 This conflict has been the source of much litigation in the
unfolding of the credit crisis.31
In the wake of the historic subprime meltdown, there has been a
proliferation of securities class action lawsuits. 32 These cases not only
include classic securities fraud cases raising section 10(b) claims under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), but cases involving mortgage-
backed securities that are not traded on a national exchange, which are
typically brought under the '33 Act.33 While, normally, such cases cannot
be removed to federal court under section 22 of the '33 Act, some courts
have read CAFA to override this nonremoval provision and allow certain
securities class actions to be removed.34 Neither CAFA nor SLUSA is a
model of clarity and, as a result, courts looking to their legislative histories
have come to conflicting conclusions regarding the interplay of these
statutes in the realm of securities class actions.35 The crux of the confusion
seems to be the dichotomy between the overall design of CAFA and
25. 15 U.S.C. § 77p (1998).
26. S. REP. No. 105-182, at 3 (1998) (noting that benefits could flow to investors from
this "uniform national approach" to "nationally-traded securities"); see id. at 5 (observing
that there are national markets for certain securities). However, the Senate report expressed
concern for the exposure of securities issuers to potentially crushing liability, a concern that
outweighed "fragmentation of investor remedies," "[a]t a time [of] increasingly experiencing
and encouraging national and international securities offerings and listings, and expending
great effort to rationalize and streamline our securities markets." Id. at 3. In other words,
during a time of increasing economic prosperity, Congress was more concerned with
protecting issuers than with protecting the dual state and federal forum remedies for
defrauded investors. Id.
27. Class Action Fairness Act, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
28. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006). In other words, complete diversity is no longer
required for federal diversity jurisdiction; minimal diversity is sufficient. Id.
29. See id. § 1453(b).
30. See 15 U.S.C. § 77(v)(a).
31. See infra notes 214-23 and accompanying text.
32. See infra note 214 and accompanying text.
33. See infra notes 217-21 and accompanying text.
34. See infra Part II.B.
35. See infra notes 285-90 and accompanying text. See generally infra Part II.
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SLUSA to protect corporate defendants and to federalize class actions,
versus the overall pro-plaintiff design of the '33 Act, which specifically
contains a nonremoval provision for securities claims brought under the '33
Act. 36 This Note examines the ensuing split in authority in the context of
the current credit crisis.
The current financial crisis-which has been dubbed a "crisis of
confidence" 37-- offers a unique context in which to resolve the conflict, as
it takes place at a critical intersection in economic history. The issues
raised form a nexus between the very concerns that prompted the two
removal provisions at issue: (1) affording broad protections for defrauded
investors as a mechanism for maintaining confidence in our nation's capital
markets and (2) curbing abuses that undermine that very confidence, stifle
the markets, and prevent federal courts from hearing cases of national
importance. Throughout the country's financial history, the ebb and flow of
investor protection has created a false dichotomy between investor
protection and market interests in deregulation. This Note proposes that
today, despite what they were in the past, the two need not be mutually
exclusive. Understanding this is critical to embracing the proper solution to
the current conflict between the '33 Act and CAFA-two pieces of
legislation that are couched in such dichotomous language.
This Note addresses the conflict between the nonremoval provision of the
'33 Act and CAFA's removal provision in the context of cases stemming
from the current credit crisis. Recently, a split in the federal circuit courts
of appeals emerged over which provision should prevail when in conflict. 38
Part I of this Note explores the historical development of the relevant
securities laws and how they have come into play in the context of the
financial crisis. The tensions between the goals of the past and the present
have created a false dichotomy between the ostensibly competing goals of
protecting investors and shoring up the capital markets. These tensions
have surfaced in the current crisis of confidence, which disturbingly
parallels the crisis of the 1930s. 39 Courts have grappled with the interplay
of section 22's nonremoval and CAFA's removal provisions in mortgage-
backed securities cases. Part II of this Note examines the current split in
authority that is craving clarification: the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit concludes that the '33 Act's nonremoval provision trumps
CAFA, while the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit and the
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York maintain that
class actions brought under the '33 Act are removable pursuant to CAFA.
Part III of this Note argues that the Seventh Circuit approach is superior
36. See infra notes 178-84.
37. Federal Reserve's First Monetary Policy Report for 2008: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. On Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 1 10th Cong. 1 (2008) [hereinafter
Monetary Policy Hearings] (statement of Sen. Christopher J. Dodd, Chairman, S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs).
38. See infra Part II.
39. See infra note 373 and accompanying text (discussing parallels between the current
crisis and the Great Depression); infra Part I.A.
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because it gives full effect to the text and historical purposes of both CAFA
and the '33 Act. The Note concludes that, not only is the Seventh Circuit's
approach true to the historical purposes of both statutes but, perhaps more
importantly, the result under this approach-federalizing class actions
involving securities implicated in a nationwide crisis-is the most suitable
solution for today's crisis of confidence. Looking toward tomorrow, in
order to restore confidence, the issue of concurrent jurisdiction under the
'33 Act must be clarified with respect to CAFA and treated with
consistency across the circuits. The current conflict is ripe for resolution.
I. PAST TO PRESENT: THE EBB AND FLOW OF INVESTOR PROTECTION
UNDER THE FEDERAL SECURITIES LAWS
In order to understand the context of the current split in authority, it is
crucial to comprehend the evolution of the legislation and, in particular, the
jurisdictional provisions of this legislation. The following sections proceed
in chronological order. Part L.A examines the background and historical
purposes of the '33 Act. Part I.B then reviews various legislative efforts to
reform the securities class action framework, beginning with the PSLRA.40
Part I.C then turns to the PSLRA's complement, SLUSA, passed in 1998.41
Part I.D explores CAFA and its underpinnings, especially with respect to its
interplay with the securities framework.42 Finally, Part I.E discusses the
current securities class action scheme in the context of the unfolding credit
crisis.
A. The Securities Act of 1933
The '33 Act came at the nadir of the Great Depression, when the stock
market and the national economy were deeply entrenched in crisis. The late
1920s had witnessed egregious securities scandals that laid waste to the
American capital markets. 43 In the decade after World War I, fifty billion
dollars in new securities were floated in the United States; half of them
were worthless.44 It was generally believed that many underwriters and
securities dealers were not in the practice of "fair, honest, and prudent
dealing," but rather, were engaged in "[h]igh-pressure salesmanship" of
these fraudulent securities. 45 They freely made "[a]lluring promises of easy
40. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
41. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-353, 112 Stat.
3227 (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
42. This Note does not intend to provide a thorough exploration of each of the Class
Action Fairness Act's (CAFA) purposes or provisions; rather, it intends to give a general
overview of CAFA with an emphasis on its purposes and provisions that specifically pertain
to securities class actions.
43. See Laylin K. James, The Securities Act of 1933, 32 MICH. L. REv. 624, 625-30
(1933) (discussing the egregious scandals and ensuing stock market crash leading to the
enactment of the '33 Act).
44. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2 (1933).
45. See, e.g., id
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wealth.., with little or no attempt to bring to the investor's attention those
facts essential to estimating the worth of any security. '4 6 Thousands of
Americans had invested their life savings in these worthless securities and
were left with nothing.47 The rest is history.
"The events of 1929 made an indelible imprint on the United States.
Much of the faith that had been shown in markets, institutions, and
politicians would quickly give way to skepticism and a longing for effective
leadership." 4 8 In spite of the many state securities statutes that existed at
the time of the crash, the public sustained severe losses at the hands of
securities dealers and corporations. 4 9  In response, the new President,
Roosevelt, saw a clear need to restore confidence in the markets with
securities legislation. 50
Roosevelt was a driving force behind securities reform and the creation
of the '33 Act.51  Just weeks after his Inaugural Address, President
Roosevelt sent a message to Congress recommending the legislation that
would protect investor confidence. 52 He demanded that the issuance of new
securities be accompanied by "full publicity and information" and insisted
that "no essentially important element [of the issuance] be concealed from
the buying public." 53 Roosevelt's message conveyed a "broad purpose of
protecting investors" in order to "bring back public confidence." 54 As such,
his proposal to "let the seller also beware" put the "burden of telling the
whole truth on the seller."
55
Roosevelt procured the efforts of Felix Frankfurter to help draft the new
bill. 56 Frankfurter assembled a team of drafters, including James Landis,
46. Id; see also Elisabeth Keller & Gregory A. Gehlmann, Introductory Comment: A
Historical Introduction to the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 329, 335 (1988) (chronicling the "[get] rich quick" schemes the
public was caught up in during the 1920s).
47. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 2. Individuals were not the only ones who suffered grievous
losses from the "irresponsible selling of securities": industry and real estate suffered as a
result of the "deliberate overstimulation" of demand for securities, creating an artificial
market that collapsed. Id.; cf infra notes 196-200 and accompanying text (discussing,
similarly, how the intentional overstimulation of subprime borrowing for those with bad
credit played a role in the subprime crisis).
48. GEISST, supra note 4, at 196.
49. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1. For an overview of the blue sky laws, the state
statutory framework in place up until the '33 Act, see Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 46, at
331-34.
50. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-2 (including a message from President Roosevelt
calling for congressional action in light of the dire situation); S. REP. No. 73-47, at 2 (1933)
(noting that federal securities legislation is necessary to restore public confidence in the
markets); see also GEISST, supra note 4, at 228 ("A federal law was needed to plug the gaps
in the patchwork of state laws.").
51. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 46, at 338-42 (noting Roosevelt's role in
galvanizing federal securities legislation).
52. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1-2.
53. Id. at 2.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. GEISST, supra note 4, at 228.
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Benjamin Cohen, and Thomas Corcoran.57 Landis brought to the table an
expertise in administrative law as well as state blue sky laws, while Cohen
and Corcoran offered their practical expertise of corporations and securities
laws acquired through clerking and practicing law. 58 The drafters-Landis
in particular-carefully recognized the need for the precise balance of detail
in the statute: they sought to avoid excessive generalities as well as
excessive detail that might have the effect of limiting the discretion of
administrators. 59 It should not be overlooked that the drafters of the '33
Act were influenced by the British philosophy of disclosure, and The
British Companies Acts of 1908 and 1929 served as models for the
legislation.60 The stated purpose of the '33 Act is "to provide full and fair
disclosure of the character of securities sold in interstate and foreign
commerce and through the mails, and to prevent frauds in the sale thereof,
and for other purposes."'6' In furtherance of the goal of full disclosure, the
'33 Act (1) requires securities issuers to file a registration statement62 and
(2) holds those who file the statements liable for any misstatements or
omissions by expressly providing for private rights of action.63 Congress
recognized that enabling investors injured by fraud to recover lost funds or
damages in private actions could play an important role in assuring
compliance with securities laws. 64
57. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 46, at 340-41 (discussing the qualifications of
the drafters of the '33 Act and, thus, their familiarity with the needs of the federal securities
legislation framework); James M. Landis, The Legislative History of the Securities Act of
1933, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 29 (1959) (recounting from firsthand experience the
legislative history behind the '33 Act).
58. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 46, at 340-41.
59. Id. at 341. Indeed, one of the drafters-James Landis-noted that a 1933
Conference Report "deliberately contained language commenting upon the meaning of
certain of the most contentious provisions of the bill in the hope that the language as an
expression of the 'intent' of Congress would control the administrative and judicial
interpretation of the act." Landis, supra note 57, at 47.
60. Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 46, at 341. The civil liabilities provisions of the '33
Act were drawn generally from the Companies Act, but they were "carefully revised" by the
drafters of the '33 Act, who were "particularly anxious through the imposition of adequate
civil liabilities" to achieve the goals of the '33 Act. Landis, supra note 57, at 35.
61. H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 1 (1933). While the '33 Act provides for regulation of
securities sold through the mail or instruments of interstate commerce, the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ('34 Act), the complement to the '33 Act, provides for regulation of
the securities exchange markets and the operations of corporations listed on the national
exchanges. See Keller & Gehlmann, supra note 46, at 330.
62. See 15 U.S.C. § 77f (2006) (requiring registration statements to be filed for securities
offerings); id. § 77g (listing disclosure requirements in registration statements); id. § 77j
(listing disclosure requirements in prospectuses); id § 77aa (requiring certain information
schedules in registration statements).
63. Id. § 77k.
64. See H.R. REP. No. 73-85, at 9 (providing victims of fraudulent securities schemes
with the ability to recover where sellers made false statements, omissions, or otherwise
failed to exhibit due care); see also Douglas, Protecting the Investor, supra note 9, at 524
(arguing that the "spectre of liability" in the Act is what will give real protection); Keller &
Gehlmann, supra note 46, at 344-45; Landis, supra note 57, at 35 (noting that the drafters
viewed civil liabilities provisions as crucial to achieving compliance with the securities
laws).
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Although the '33 Act was largely based on preexisting state statutory and
common-law fraud principles, the Act intentionally deviated from these
models and imposed fewer pleading requirements as a form of greater
investor protection. 65 Moreover, an examination of the procedural and
substantive differences between the '33 Act and the '34 Act,66 which served
to counterbalance the '33 Act, is instructive; the '34 Act addressed a
different type of harm and allowed for a wider range of claims than the '33
Act; thus the barriers for '34 Act claims are naturally higher.67
Another form of enhanced investor protection that the drafters of the '33
Act consciously recognized is the nonremoval provision of the Act.68
Section 22 of the '33 Act, which confers concurrent jurisdiction on state
and federal courts over private causes of action brought under the '33 Act,
69
provides that "no case arising under [the Securities Act of 1933] and
brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be removed to any
court of the United States." 70 Remarkably, there is a dearth of legislative
history on section 22 of the '33 Act.7 1 While the lack of legislative history
behind an unconventional provision is perplexing, given that section 22
belongs to "a rather exclusive club of federal non-removal provisions,"
72
65. Specifically, the '33 Act did not require plaintiffs to prove reliance, loss causation,
or any particular state of mind of any defendant. See Douglas, Protecting the Investor, supra
note 9, at 524 ("The common law with its insistence upon the presence of an intent.., to
defraud, of a causal relation... and of a reliance ... presented almost insuperable
procedural barriers to recovery."); cf infra Part I.B (discussion of the Private Securities
Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA)). However, in stark contrast with the litigious
1990s when the PSLRA was enacted, the "failure on the part of many with just claims to
seek reparation [was] most conspicuous" during the financial scandals of the 1930s.
Douglas, Protecting the Investor, supra note 9, at 525.
66. See 15 U.S.C. § 78a.
67. See Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 186, 206 (1976) (noting that the '33
Act and the '34 Act are interrelated). However, the '34 Act was intended to address a
different type of wrongdoing. Id. at 194-95 (the '33 Act was designed to protect investors
from fraud and promote full disclosure through the imposition of civil liabilities, while the
'34 Act was meant to protect against manipulation of stock prices and promote efficient
securities trading); id. at 208, 212 & n.32 (the '33 Act was meant to address negligent
conduct, while the '34 Act is specifically meant to address intentional misconduct). Since
section 10(b) of the '34 Act addresses intentional, and not negligent, wrongdoing, plaintiffs
face some different procedural requirements. Id. at 186, 208-09.
68. See 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a); infra note 77 and accompanying text.
69. 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a) (providing that "[tihe district courts of the United States and the
United States courts of any Territory shall have jurisdiction of offenses and violations under
this subchapter and under the rules and regulations promulgated by the Commission in
respect thereto, and, concurrent with State and Territorial courts").
70. Id. Compare this provision with the '34 Act, which exclusively provides for federal
jurisdiction. Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 27, 15 U.S.C. § 78aa (providing that "[t]he
district courts of the United States and the United States courts of any Territory or other
place subject to the jurisdiction of the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction of
violations of this chapter").
71. See Jeffrey T. Cook, Recrafting the Jurisdictional Framework for Private Rights of
Action Under the Federal Securities Laws, 55 AM. U. L. REv. 621, 632 & nn.83-84 (2006)
(observing the lack of legislative history on section 22).
72. Id. at 633.
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looking to the rationales behind other analogous nonremoval provisions73
underscores the overall pro-plaintiff nature of these provisions.74
Notwithstanding the paucity of legislative history behind section 22, in
1934 Congress did note the conflict between the nonremoval provision of
the '33 Act and the exclusive jurisdiction provision of the '34 Act-and
even considered an amendment to grant exclusive federal jurisdiction over
'33 Act claims 5-but expressly declined to do so.76 The proposal was
opposed by Landis, who was "instrumental in inserting the exclusive
jurisdiction provision into the 1934 Act." 77
With respect to private rights of action, the securities legislation
landscape and section 22 remained largely untouched until the 1990s.78
This speaks to the vital role that the availability of private rights of action
play in the capital markets today. "The SEC enforcement program and the
availability of private rights of action together provide a means for
defrauded investors to recover damages" and are a "powerful deterrent
against violations of the securities laws." 79 The success of capital markets
is critically dependent upon investor confidence in the integrity of the
markets, 80 and private securities actions are crucial to maintaining that
confidence. 81
73. See id. at 633-34 & nn.90-95 (discussing various interests served by other federal
nonremoval provisions, including "preserving a plaintiffs' choice of forum").
74. Id. at 634 & nn.93, 95 (noting that both the U.S. Supreme Court and Congress have
recognized in worker's compensation and tort cases that federal nonremoval provisions are
an expression of congressional intent to give plaintiffs an absolute choice of forum in order
to avail themselves of procedural advantages). "Applying these rationales to the 1933 Act
and its overall pro-plaintiff nature, one court concluded that the non-removal provision of the
1933 Act, 'like others of the same genre, has the evident purpose of favoring plaintiffs'
choice of forum."' Id. at 634 (quoting Pinto v. Maremont Corp., 326 F. Supp. 165, 167 n.2
(S.D.N.Y. 1971)).
75. See Hazen, supra note 15, at 741-42 (noting that the American Bar Association
proposed an amendment in 1933 to eliminate state courts' concurrent jurisdiction).
76. 78 CONG. REc. 8563, 8571 (1934) (statement of Sen. Bymes) (noting that the Senate
bill, like the '33 Act, gives concurrent jurisdiction, while the House version of the bill gives
exclusive jurisdiction to the federal courts); Cook, supra note 71, at 633 & n. 85-88.
77. Hazen, supra note 15, at 741 (citing 78 CONG. REC. 8666, 8717 (statement of James
M. Landis)).
78. Cook, supra note 71, at 633 n.87 (observing that the nonremoval provision remained
unchanged until the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 (SLUSA)); Keller
& Gehlmann, supra note 46, at 331 (observing in 1988 that, "[w]hile the Securities Act and
the Exchange Act have been amended over the years, 'the basic concepts and objectives of
the original statutes have not been changed"' (quoting ROBERTA S. KARMEL, REGULATION BY
PROSECUTION: THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION VS. CORPORATE AMERICA 44
(1982))).
79. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 8 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687.
80. See id. ("The success of the U.S. securities markets is largely the result of a high
level of investor confidence in the integrity and efficiency of our markets.").
81. See id at 37, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 715 ("That confidence is
maintained because investors know they have effective remedies against persons who would
defraud them. Both Republican and Democratic Chairmen of the Securities and Exchange
Commission have stressed the integral role of the private right of action in maintaining
investor confidence."); see also id. at 38, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 716 ("'Given
the continued growth in the size and complexity of our securities markets, and the absolute
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Nevertheless, abusive practices in private securities litigation can equally
undermine confidence in and the success of the market. During the
prosperous economy of the 1990s, Congress's concern with abusive
securities litigation practices supplanted its Depression era concerns with
protecting defrauded investors. Parts I.B and I.C explore two subsequent
pieces of securities legislation and how they have altered the securities
litigation landscape: the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act and the
Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.
B. The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
The PSLRA brought sweeping procedural changes to the federal
securities law framework. The reform legislation added a new section 27 to
the '33 Act, including various procedural provisions. 82  These were
intended to sieve out "strong cases" from "weak" cases in an effort to
eliminate "abusive practices. '8 3
Though Congress acknowledged that the enactments of the '33 and '34
Acts were intended "to promote investor confidence in the United States
securities markets" 84 and "help to deter wrongdoing," 85 the wrongdoings
that Congress was concerned with during the Great Depression were
perpetrated by securities issuers. By contrast, in 1995 when the economy
was much stronger, the tide of Congress's focus turned from the
wrongdoings of securities issuers to the wrongdoings of securities plaintiffs
and plaintiffs' attorneys. Rather than focus on creating private rights of
action for investors, this time Congress lamented what it felt had become an
"excessively litigious society."'86 Congress was confronted with substantial
concerns over "abusive" securities claims threatening the integrity of the
certainty that persons seeking to perpetrate financial fraud will always be among us, private
actions will continue to be essential to the maintenance of investor protection."' (statement
of the Director of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission's (SEC) Division of
Enforcement in 1993)).
82. Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737
(codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.).
83. H.R. REP. No. 104-50(I), at 14 (1995) (referring to statements made by Arthur
Levitt, chairman of the SEC at the time, to the effect that "in order for investors to have
confidence in the securities markets, they must have confidence in their right to seek fair
recovery from those that may defraud them"). However, Levitt also notes that if the system
fails to distinguish between "strong cases and weak cases," it fails to serve both of its
purposes, namely, serving as a deterrent and assuring that fraud victims recover their losses.
Id. at 14-15.
84. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; see also H.R.
REP. No. 104-369, at 31 (1995) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730
("The overriding purpose of our Nation's securities laws is to protect investors and to
maintain confidence in the securities markets ....").
85. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 ("[P]rivate
lawsuits promote public and global confidence in our capital markets and help to deter
wrongdoing ... ").
86. H.R. REP. No. 104-50(I), at 14. Compare this with the sentiment at the time the '33
Act and '34 Act were passed-that many defrauded investors with just claims never sought
legal redress. See supra note 65.
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system87 and their adverse effects on the growth of the economy.88
According to congressional reports, it was Congress's understanding that
both investors and the national economy suffer when innocent parties are
forced to pay "exorbitant 'settlements"' in meritless lawsuits. 89 To this end,
Congress hoped that the PSLRA "'[would] return some fairness and
common sense to [the] broken securities class action litigation system,
while continuing to provide the highest level of protection to investors in
our capital markets.' 90
The systematic "abusive" practices that led to PSLRA's enactment
embodied several characteristics: (1) routinely filing frivolous suits
alleging cookie-cutter violations of the federal securities laws whenever
there was a significant change in stock price, (2) targeting deep-pocketed
defendants, and (3) abusing discovery practices in the hopes that the
defendant would make a quick and sizeable settlement in order to avoid the
expense of litigation. 91 This systematic abuse was often accomplished
through the manipulation of class action plaintiffs at the hands of their own
lawyers. 92
These systematic practices informed the procedural changes made to the
'33 Act by the PSLRA's new section 27. 93 One procedural change was the
creation of a "safe harbor provision" for both the '33 and '34 Acts.94
Although the hallmark of the federal securities laws is full disclosure to
investors of information relevant to the financial condition of securities, it
was argued by some members that the "'threat of mass shareholder
litigation"' perverted this purpose and instead caused a "'chilling"' effect
87. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683; see also
H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (raising the concern
that the system is being undermined by "abusive and meritless" suits).
88. See H.R. REP. No. 104-50(I), at 14 (expressing concern about the "high costs for the
American economy" that are concomitant with "dramatic growth in litigation").
89. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731
(commenting that the issuer's own investors "are always the ultimate losers" when an
"insurer must pay lawyers' fees, make settlement payments, and expend management and
employee resources in defending a meritless suit"); see also id. at 37-38, reprinted in 1995
U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 736-37 (noting the injurious effect that "joint and several liability" has
on the entire economy when qualified directors turn down positions to avoid the risk of
unlimited exposure to meritless lawsuits).
90. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 4, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 683 (quoting
Securities Litigation Reform Proposals: Hearings on S. 240, S. 667, and H.R. 1058 Before
the Subcomm. on Securities of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 104th
Cong. 36 (1995) (statement of Sen. Pete Domenici)).
91. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730 (discussing
evidence of abusive practices committed in private securities litigation); S. REP. No. 104-98,
at 8-9, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 687-88.
92. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 31, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 730
(discussing "the manipulation by class action lawyers of the clients whom they purportedly
represent.").
93. See Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2
(2006) (amending the '33 Act's liability provisions by creating a safe harbor provision for
certain forward-looking statements). For an overview of the PSLRA and its provisions, see
THOMAS LEE HAZEN, LAW OF SECURITIEs REGULATION § 7.17[1] (5th ed. 2009).
94. 15 U.S.C §§ 77z-2(c), 78u-5(c) (2006).
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on disclosure of "'forward-looking"' information.9 5 As a result, instead of
receiving more information, investors actually receive less. 96 The purpose
of the safe harbor provision is to encourage issuers to make "forward
looking statements" without "fear of open-ended liability. ' 97 Additionally,
the PSLRA imposed a scienter requirement for those filing claims under the
'33 and/or '34 Acts.9 8 This requirement imposed a heightened pleading
standard demanding "particularity" of the plaintiff.99 The new section also
required a showing of loss causation to make out a successful claim. 10 0 The
PSLRA also specifically addressed securities class actions: it established
the "most adequate plaintiff' requirement for claims under the '33 or '34
Acts.10 1 Proponents of this measure asserted that it protects investors who
join a class action against "lawyer-driven lawsuits" by counterbalancing the
lawyer's control with a lead plaintiff who has substantial holdings of the
securities. 10 2 The goals of this and other provisions are to effectively
transfer primary control of securities litigation from lawyers to the investors
and to reduce the settlement value of frivolous suits. 10 3 The lead plaintiff is
also required to file a sworn certification statement to address the
"professional plaintiff' problem. 104
The discovery stay, another procedural change imposed by the PSLRA,
was a response to Congress's observation that discovery in securities class
actions can resemble a "fishing expedition," the cost of which often forces
defendants to settle in abusive class actions. 10 5 This provision seeks to
minimize costs incurred by the defendant while a motion to dismiss or a
motion for summary judgment is pending. 10 6 A new provision calling for
stricter application of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
95. S. REP. No. 104-98, at 5, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 684 (quoting Safe
Harbor for Forward-Looking Statements, Securities Act Release No. 7101, Exchange Act
Release No. 34,831, Investment Company Act Release No. 20,613, 57 SEC Docket 1999
(October 13, 1994)); see also id. at 9-10, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 688-89
(noting that such abusive litigation threatens the very underpinnings of the securities laws-
disclosure to investors-by deterring forward-looking statements); id. 15-18, reprinted in
1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694-97 (discussing the safe harbor for forward-looking statements).
96. Id. at 5, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 684.
97. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32, 42-46, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731,
741-45.
98. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-2(b), 78u-5(b). It is unclear whether the PSLRA's procedural
requirements apply to '33 Act claims brought in state court. See Cook, supra note 71, at 636
n.113.
99. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 41, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 740; S. REP. No.
104-98, at 15, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 694.
100. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 23, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 702.
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I), 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I).
102. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731.
103. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 6-7, 12, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 685-86,
691.
104. Id. at 10-11, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 689-90.
105. See S. REP. No. 104-98, at 14, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 693; see also 15
U.S.C. §§ 77z-l(b), 78u-4(b)(3).
106. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731.
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provides for attorney sanctions for pursuing meritless litigation. 10 7 The
PSLRA also created a "fair share" rule. By modifying joint and several
liability, this provision seeks to insulate outside directors and parties who
do not have knowledge of securities violations from liability for damage
caused by others. 10 8 Finally, the legislation creates an opportunity for
victims of abusive securities lawsuits to recover their attorneys' fees. 109
The PSLRA was met with mixed reviews. Proponents of the Reform Act
included, generally speaking, accountants, securities firms, and the high-
technology industry. They believed they were victims of meritless lawsuits
and benefitted from PSLRA's new procedural rules. 1' 0 Opponents of the
legislation recognized a need for some reforms, but countered that securities
class actions played a critical role in protecting investors from fraud. I l
Critics have expressed concerns that the provisions may frustrate
meritorious lawsuits. 112
The consequences of the PSLRA-both intended and unintended-help
to inform the trajectory of the subsequent legislation. The Report to the
President and the Congress on the First Year of Practice Under the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 observed that the effect of the
PSLRA was that the discovery stay, coupled with the heightened pleading
standards, made it more difficult for plaintiffs to bring and prosecute
securities class action lawsuits. 1 3 The SEC Report concluded that "the
most significant development in securities litigation post-Reform Act" was
an increase in the number of securities class actions filed in state court. 114
107. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77z-1(c)(2), 78u-4(c)(2); see also S. REP. No. 104-98, at 13-14,
reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 692-93.
108. See H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32, 37-39, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731,
736-38; S. REP. No. 104-98, at 20-23, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 699-702.
109. H.R. REP. No. 104-369, at 32, 39, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 730, 731, 738.
110. U.S. SEC, OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNSEL, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND THE
CONGRESS ON THE FIRST YEAR OF PRACTICE UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION
REFORM ACT OF 1995 (1997), http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/lreform.txt [hereinafter SEC
REPORT].
111. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 104-98, at 36, reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 679, 714 (Sens.
Paul Sarbanes, Richard Bryan, and Barbara Boxer support deterring frivolous lawsuits, but
argue that the bill does not protect the ability of the investors to sue under the securities laws,
and thus "threatens the capital formation process by undermining the confidence on which
our markets depend"); SEC REPORT, supra note 110. It should be noted that the report cites
to testimony given by William Lerach, who later pled guilty to conspiracy for his
involvement in an alleged scheme to bribe people to become plaintiffs in securities class
action lawsuits. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH: SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CASE FILINGS,
2007: A YEAR IN REVIEW 19 (2007) [hereinafter CORNERSTONE STUDY 2007], available at
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouseresearch/2007_YIR/20080103-01 .pdf
(discussing Lerach's guilty plea).
112. See SEC REPORT, supra note 110, pt. II.B (quoting President Bill Clinton's veto
message, in which he stated that he was unwilling to sign legislation that would have the
effect of "closing the courthouse door" on investors with legitimate claims).
113. See id. pt. 1I.A.
114. See id pt. I; see also JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST ET AL., SECURITIES CLASS ACTION
LITIGATION IN Q1 1998: A REPORT TO NASDAQ FROM THE STANFORD LAW SCHOOL
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION CLEARINGHOUSE pt. II (1998), http://securities.stanford.edu/
research/reports/19980602ql.html [hereinafter STANFORD REPORT] (commenting that a
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During the first year after the PSLRA's enactment, many of the state cases
were being filed contemporaneously with federal cases, 1 15 apparently in an
attempt to circumvent some of the new federal procedural requirements
imposed by the Act-particularly the discovery stay." 16
The SEC's report to the president offered several reasons to help explain
this increase in state court filings. First, some plaintiffs were filing in state
court in order to avoid the discovery stay imposed by the Act. 117 In state
court, plaintiffs may be able to take advantage of more lenient state
discovery rules, which enable plaintiffs to obtain the facts necessary to
withstand a motion to dismiss."18 Moreover, even though state courts
traditionally do not provide remedies as broad as the federal remedies for
securities fraud, there may be other advantages, including nonunanimous
jury verdicts, punitive damages, and aiding and abetting liability. 119 These
unintended consequences of the PSLRA were the focus of the next
congressional legislative response, which is the subject of Part I.C of this
Note: the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act.
C. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998
Though PSLRA made significant changes to private causes of action
under the federal securities laws, the jurisdictional provisions, including the
nonremoval provision of the '33 Act, remained untouched. As a result,
plaintiffs asserting claims under the '33 Act were able to sidestep the new
pleading and procedural requirements implemented by PSLRA by filing in
state, rather than federal, court. 120  SLUSA sought to plug up this
jurisdictional loophole by making federal court the venue for most
securities class action lawsuits. It did so by creating an exception to the
nonremoval provision of the '33 Act for cases involving covered
securities. 12 1  SLUSA amended section 22 of the '33 Act by adding
significant concern that has arisen in the wake of the PSLRA is that plaintiff's attorneys have
shifted a significant portion of class action activity to state court in an apparent attempt to
evade the Act's procedural restrictions).
115. According to the SEC Report, of the 105 federal actions filed in 1996, at least
twenty-six were tied to a parallel state action, and the Stanford Securities Class Action
Clearinghouse counted thirty-nine stand-alone state court actions. SEC REPORT, supra note
110, pt. VII.A.
116. See SEC REPORT, supra note 110, pt. VII (reporting that forty percent of the
securities class actions filed in the first ten months of 1996 were filed in state court,
compared to just over twenty percent in 1995).
117. Id. pt. VII.A.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. See Michael A. Perino, Fraud and Federalism: Preempting Private Securities
Fraud Causes of Action, 50 STAN. L. REv. 273, 273 (1998) (deeming the shift in forum, from
federal court to state court, in securities fraud class action litigation an "unintended by-
product" of PSLRA, and suggesting that plaintiffs are resorting to state courts in order to
avoid the procedural hurdles of the PSLRA-a strategy that threatens to undermine the
policies behind the legislation).
121. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 77p(c)
(2006). For an overview of SLUSA, see HAZEN, supra note 93, § 7.17[2].
2009] 1449
FORDHAM LA W REVIEW
§ 77p(c), 122 which provides that "[a]ny covered class action brought in any
State court involving a covered security, as set forth in subsection (b) of this
section, shall be removable to the Federal district court for the district in
which the action is pending, and shall be subject to subsection (b) of this
section."' 123 A "covered security" is a security that is traded on a national
exchange, such as the New York Stock Exchange, the NASDAQ, or the
American Stock Exchange.124
SLUSA was spurred by the unintended side effects of PSLRA observed
in the years immediately following its enactment, 125 namely, the marked
increase in securities class actions being filed in state courts-a rare
phenomenon until the passage of the PSLRA. 126 Even more peculiar was
that this development was reflected primarily in suits involving publicly
traded securities, which were rarely litigated in state court prior to the
PSLRA. 12 7 This increase threatened to undermine the very intent of the
PSLRA128 by using state courts to do the very same thing it sought to avoid
in federal courts. 129 To that end, SLUSA sought to cure this infirmity by
enacting "national standards" for securities class actions involving
"nationally traded securities," while still preserving state remedies available
122. Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 101(a)(3), 15 U.S.C. §
77p(c); see 15 U.S.C. § 77v(a). The nonremoval provision of the '33 Act now reads, in
relevant part, as follows: "Except as provided in section 77p(c) of this title, no case arising
under this subchapter and brought in any State court of competent jurisdiction shall be
removed to any court of the United States." Id.
123. Id. § 77p(c); Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-
353, 112 Stat. 3227.
124. See 15 U.S.C. § 77r(b) (defining "covered security" for purposes of SLUSA).
125. See, e.g., SEC REPORT, supra note 110; JOSEPH A. GRUNDFEST & MICHAEL A.
PERINO, STANFORD LAW SCH., SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM: THE FIRST YEAR'S
EXPERIENCE: A STATISTICAL AND LEGAL ANALYSIS OF CLASS ACTION SECURITIES FRAUD
LITIGATION UNDER THE PRIVATE SECURITIES LITIGATION REFORM ACT OF 1995 (1997),
http://securities.stanford.edu/research/studies/ 9970227firstyrfirstyr.html [hereinafter
GRUNDFEST-PERINO STUDY] (discussing the effects of the PSLRA).
126. H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 14 (1998) (Conf. Rep.) (citing GRUNDFEST-PERINO
STUDY, supra note 125). The congressional report cited evidence indicating that the decline
in the level of class action securities fraud litigation in federal courts has been met by "an
almost equal increase in the level of state court activity, largely as a result of a 'substitution
effect' whereby plaintiffs resort to state court to avoid the new, more stringent requirements
of federal cases." Id. Prior to the PSLRA, there was "essentially no significant securities
class action litigation brought in State court." Id.; see also SEC REPORT, supra note 110,
passim (finding a significant increase in state filings).
127. See Perino, supra note 120, at 307-11 & tbls.III-IV, 334. See generally GRUNDFEST-
PERINO STUDY, supra note 125.
128. H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 14 (citing GRUNDFEST-PERINO STUDY, supra note 125);
see also Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act of 1998 § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 78(a) (noting
that, since the enactment of the PSLRA in 1995, "considerable evidence has been presented
to Congress that a number of securities class action lawsuits have shifted from Federal to
State courts," preventing that Act from "fully achieving its objectives").
129. See H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 14-15 (noting that plaintiffs' lawyers have sought to
circumvent the PSLRA's provisions "by filing frivolous and speculative lawsuits in State
court, where essentially none of the Reform Act's procedural or substantive protections
against abusive suits are available").
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to certain plaintiffs and "not changing the current treatment of individual
lawsuits." 130
SLUSA makes federal court the venue for "most," but not all, securities
class action lawsuits. 131  "Covered securities" are the touchstone of
SLUSA; covered securities are securities that are publicly traded on a
national exchange. 132 Under SLUSA, class actions relating to a "covered
security" alleging fraud or manipulation "must be maintained pursuant to
the provisions of Federal securities law, in Federal court (subject to certain
exceptions)." 133 One reason covered securities were singled out by SLUSA
is that companies with publicly traded securities cannot control where their
securities are traded after an initial public offering; thus, issuers of such
securities cannot choose to avoid jurisdictions that present unreasonable
litigation costs. 134 In effect, "a single state can impose the risks and costs
of its peculiar litigation system on all national issuers."' 135 As a result,
SLUSA intended to adopt a "uniform national approach" to securities class
actions involving nationally traded securities. 136
While the legislative history in some instances makes plain that SLUSA
"only covers precisely those securities defined in the National Securities
Markets Improvements Act (NSMIA), principally those securities that are
traded on national exchanges,"'137 the SLUSA amendment is hardly a
model of clarity with respect to its effect on '33 Act claims in state court. 138
130. Id. at 2; see also Perino, supra note 120, at 334 ("The inclusion of securities that
trade on national markets certainly makes sense because most of the shift to state court has
involved cases alleging some type of fraudulent activity in connection with the purchase or
sale of [nationally traded] securities.").
131. H.R. REP..No. 105-803, at 13.
132. Drawing the line at "covered securities" is consistent with SLUSA's predecessor, the
National Securities Markets Improvement Act (NSMIA). See Pub. L. No. 104-290 (1996)
(NSMIA amended the '33 Act by adding section 18(b), which exempts "covered securities"
from state regulation of securities offerings); H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 13; Perino, supra
note 120, at 334-35 (analyzing the proposal to apply NSMIA's "national" standard in the
private action context).
133. H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 13. Exceptions were carved out for four types of actions,
including the following: (1) certain actions based on law of the state in which issuer is
incorporated; (2) actions brought by states and political subdivisions and state pension plans;
(3) actions by party to a contractual agreement; and (4) certain shareholder derivative
actions. Id. at 13-14.
134. S. REP. No. 105-182, at 5 (1998) (quoting Keith P. Bishop).
135. H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 15 (citation omitted).
136. S. REP. No. 105-182, at 3.
137. Id. at5.
138. Courts that have had occasion to consider whether or not SLUSA allows the removal
of '33 Act claims filed in state court often arrived at conflicting conclusions. See In re Waste
Mgmt., Inc. Sec. Litig., 194 F. Supp. 2d 590, 596 (S.D. Tex. 2002) (holding that such claims
are not removable); accord Haw. Structural Ironworker's Pension Trust Fund v. Calpine
Corp., No. 03CV0714BTM(JFS), 2003 WL 23509312 (S.D. Cal. Aug. 27, 2003) (remanding
to state court and holding that the plain language of § 77(p)(c) allows only for the removal of
state law claims, not claims brought under the '33 Act); Nauheim v. Interpublic Group of
Cos., No. 02-C-9211, 2003 WL 1888843, (N.D. 111. Apr. 16, 2003). Contra Brody v.
Homestore, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 2d 1122 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (finding that Congress intended to
authorize broad removal of securities actions filed in state court, including '33 Act claims).
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Although Congress ostensibly intended for SLUSA to make federal courts
the exclusive forum for claims involving nationally traded securities, 139
SLUSA has actually reached the anomalous result of permitting removal of
state law actions. 140 While Congress lamented the shift to state courts, this
sentiment contradicted its previously expressed intent for investors to have
the opportunity to do precisely that when federal courts failed to provide
investors with adequate protection. 141 Some members of Congress argued
against SLUSA, much as they did against the PSLRA, asserting that
eliminating state court remedies leaves investors without an effective
remedy. 142
While various courts grappled with SLUSA's provisions and purposes, a
subsequent piece of legislation-the Class Action Fairness Act of 2005-
attempted to reform the class action landscape as a whole and introduce
some semblance of uniformity. Ironically, CAFA has inadvertently had the
opposite effect, spawning more litigation over its effects on the pre-CAFA
securities jurisdictional framework.
D. The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005
As early as 1998-the same year that SLUSA was enacted-Congress
began deliberating about plans to enact comprehensive class action
litigation reform measures. 143 These plans eventually culminated in the
See generally Seth Aronson et al., Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act: 2008
Update, in PLI SECURITIES LITIGATION & ENFORCEMENT INSTITUTE 2008, at 221, 231-32
(2008) (citing a series of conflicting decisions interpreting SLUSA's effect on removal of
cases under the '33 Act); Jordan A. Costa, Note, Removal of Securities Act of 1933 Claims
After SLUSA: What Congress Changed, And What It Left Alone, 78 ST. JOHN'S L. REv.
1193, 1195, 1207-17 (2004) (noting that the imprecise language in the SLUSA amendment
to the '33 Act's nonremoval provision results in difficulties in its application, leading to
conflicting court decisions and unpredictability).
139. See H.R. REP. No. 105-803, at 15 ("The solution to this problem is to make Federal
court the exclusive venue for most securities fraud class action litigation involving nationally
traded securities.").
140. See Cook, supra note 71, at 638.
141. See S. REP. No. 105-182, at 23-24, 24 n.3 (statement of Sen. Jack Reed) (pointing
out that many of his colleagues voted in favor of the PSLRA with the understanding that if
investors were not provided with adequate protection at the federal level, they could avail
themselves of the opportunity to file a state suit if they so chose); see also HAZEN, supra
note 93, § 7.17[2][A] (noting that SLUSA's failure to modify the concurrent jurisdiction
provision of the '33 Act evidenced an intent not to preclude lawsuits brought under the '33
Act from state court).
142. S. REP. No. 105-182, at 11-12 (statement of Sens. Sarbanes, Bryan, and Johnson)
(opposing PSLRA and SLUSA on the grounds that eliminating state court remedies leaves
innocent investors without an effective remedy).
143. See H.R. 3789, 105th Cong. (1998) (introducing the Class Action Jurisdiction Act of
1998). The reforms sought in the Class Action Jurisdiction Act made repeat appearances on
the congressional agenda under a variety of names for a number of years before some of
them were eventually realized in CAFA. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 108-123 (2003) (the Class
Action Fairness Act of 2003); 148 CONG. REC. H838-01 (2002) (the Class Action Fairness
Act of 2002); S. REP. No. 106-420 (2000) (the Class Action Fairness Act of 2000); H.R. REP.
No. 106-320 (1999) (the Interstate Class Action Jurisdiction Act of 1999).
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enactment of CAFA. 144 CAFA sought to expand diversity jurisdiction over
class actions in order to allow class actions of a national nature to be heard
in federal court. 145  To that end, it eliminated the complete diversity
requirement and modified the amount-in-controversy requirement for
lawsuits that can be characterized as class actions. 146 Now, under CAFA,
federal district courts have "original jurisdiction of any civil action in which
the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000... and is
a class action in which.. . any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of
a State different from any defendant."' 147 Essentially, by expanding
diversity jurisdiction, CAFA broadly provides for the removal of class
action lawsuits that are likely to be of national importance. 148 However,
CAFA does not apply to certain class actions, including those Congress had
already addressed in SLUSA-those involving covered securities. 149
A main concern that led Congress to pass this legislation allowing for
removal of nationwide class actions is similar to the primary concern that
guided the enactment of SLUSA for securities class actions: the
exponential increase in state court filings. 150 Congress was concerned that
cases that were of national importance were being systematically filed in
particular state courts that had a reputation for being plaintiff friendly, on
the theory they would be more likely to hear unmeritorious cases than
federal courts. 151
One malady CAFA aimed to cure was lawyer-driven lawsuits. 152
Resourceful lawyers sought to "game the system" by craftily pleading
around diversity requirements. 153 They did so for their own gain in the
form of enormous attorneys' fees, which were obtained at the expense of
both defendants-who may not have been in the wrong, yet were
effectively coerced into settling in order to avoid potentially bankrupting
144. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
145. Class Action Fairness Act § 2(b), 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006).
146. In a vein similar to SLUSA, CAFA closed a loophole by extending its reach to
"mass actions." See Class Action Fairness Act § 4(a)(2), 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1 1)(B)(i)
(deeming mass actions, or actions in which "monetary relief claims of 100 or more persons
are proposed to be tried jointly" and involve "common questions of law or fact," a
removable category of class actions for CAFA's purposes).
147. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).
148. Id. (providing for the removal of "any" civil action meeting the criteria set forth in
the statute).
149. See infra notes 167-78 and accompanying text.
150. One report states that federal class action filings had increased by more than 300%
over the preceding ten years, while class action filings in state courts increased by more than
1000%. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 13 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 13-14.
151. See Jeffrey L. Roether, Note, Interpreting Congressional Silence: CAFA's
Jurisdictional Burden of Proof in Post-removal Remand Proceedings, 75 FORDHAM L. REV.
2745, 2751, 2753-54 (2007) (discussing reasons why plaintiffs' lawyers prefer to bring class
actions in state court).
152. See id. at 2751-57 (discussing the perceived abuses by plaintiffs' lawyers that
riddled the class action system).
153. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 10, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 11 (noting that
lawyers who preferred to litigate in state courts were able to "game the system" due to
loopholes in the "complete diversity" and "amount-in-controversy" requirements).
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litigation-and the plaintiffs themselves, who were often left with mere
"coupon settlements" or, in some cases, even worse off than they were
before. 154 To address the problem of lawyer-driven lawsuits, CAFA
established a Consumer Class Action Bill of Rights. 155
This Note focuses on the second result of this systematic "abuse" of class
actions that CAFA sought to eliminate: the practice of forum shopping for
"magnet" states. 156  Like SLUSA, CAFA was concerned with the
nationwide effect of state forum shopping. 157 State courts were effectively
setting national policy, 58 which Congress felt should be left to the federal
courts 159 in order to comport with the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. 160
As such, a primary purpose of CAFA, as stated in the Act itself, is to restore
154. See id. at 14-21, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 15-22; 148 CONG. REC. H838-
01, H839 (2002) (statement of Rep. Pryce); id. at H840 (statement of Rep. Goodlatte); id. at
H844 (statement of Rep. Pence). "Coupon settlements" are settlements "in which class
members receive nothing more than promotional coupons to purchase more products from
the defendants." S. REP. No. 109-14, at 15, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 16; id. at 15-
20, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 16-20 (citing numerous examples of coupon
settlements).
155. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 27-28, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 27-28.
156. See 151 CONG. REC. H723-01, H726 (2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner)
(noting the "exponential increase in State class action cases in a handful of 'magnet' or
'magic' jurisdictions, many of which deal with national issues" and that, as a result, these
courts end up "setting policy for the entire country"); 148 CONG. REC. H838-01, H842
(2002) (statement of Rep. Cox) (discussing the rise of "forum shopping"-a practice
whereby clever lawyers "get to pick the one place in America where [they] know [they] are
going to win, whether [they] are right or whether [they] are wrong"). Representative Cox
also asserted that such forum shopping has resulted in a handful of local courts making law
for an entire nation. Id. The magnet jurisdictions consistently referred to are "Madison
County, Illinois; Jefferson County, Texas; and Palm Beach County, Florida." Id; see also
Roether, supra note 151, at 2756-57 (describing the abuses that plague these magnet
jurisdictions).
157. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 4, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 5 (discussing the
perceived consequence that many multistate or nationwide cases were being heard in state,
and not federal, courts).
158. See id. (stating that a "key reason" for the problems with the class action system was
that "most class actions [were] adjudicated in state courts" where governing rules are applied
unfairly and inconsistently). This becomes important because these actions in state court
could potentially set national policy. Id., reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 6; Roether,
supra note 151, at 2757-58 (observing that one state court could potentially dictate to forty-
nine others what the law should be, which "flies in the face of basic federalism principles"
because other states would have to abide by the deciding state court's law regardless of its
own policy choices).
159. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 5, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 6 ("Because interstate
class actions typically involve more people, more money, and more interstate commerce
ramifications than any other type of lawsuit, the Committee firmly believes that such cases
properly belong in federal court.").
160. See id. at 5, 7-8, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 6, 8-9 (stating that the purpose
of diversity jurisdiction is to allow cases to be heard in a forum that is not unfair to out-of-
state defendants); Roether, supra note 15 1, at 2754-55 (pointing out that large class actions
involving diverse parties implicate the precise historical concerns that the founders felt were
deserving of federal court protection).
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the intent of the framers of the Constitution 61 by "providing for Federal
court consideration of interstate cases of national importance under
diversity jurisdiction." 162
At the same time, CAFA strives to carve out opportunities to exempt
from its jurisdictional reach claims that are primarily local in nature and
"lack national implications. ' 163 There are two ways that such claims can
remain in state court: (1) if certain diversity-related criteria are met 164 or,
failing that, (2) in certain instances where it is unclear whether a case is
national or local in nature, CAFA accords federal courts the discretion to
decline jurisdiction by looking to a "totality of the circumstances." 165
Unlike SLUSA, the scope of CAFA is not limited to securities; it applies
to nationwide class actions as a whole. 166 CAFA's legislative history is
replete with examples of "abusive" tort, pharmaceutical, and environmental
class actions, 167 but never mentions the plethora of "abusive" securities
actions with which SLUSA was preoccupied. 168 Indeed, the only express
161. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 24, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 24 ("Clearly, a system
that allows state court judges to dictate national policy ... from the local courthouse steps is
contrary to the intent of the Framers when they crafted our system of federalism.").
162. Class Action Fairness Act § 2, 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006) (findings and purposes of
the Act); see id. (expressing concern that over the past decade there have been "abuses of the
class action device" that have "undermine[d] the national judicial system, the free flow of
interstate commerce, and the concept of diversity jurisdiction as intended by the framers of
the United States Constitution, in that State and local courts are ... keeping cases of national
importance out of Federal court"); see also 148 CONG. REc. H838-01, H842-43 (statement
of Rep. Cox) (arguing that the system as it existed before CAFA frustrated the intent of the
Framers for diversity jurisdiction to guard against local prejudice).
163. 151 CoNG. REc. S1076-01, S1079 (2005) (statement of Rep. Dodd); see also S. REP.
No. 109-14, at 36-37, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 35 (explaining that claims that are
of "national or interstate interest" argue in favor of the matter being handled in federal
court).
164. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(4)(B) (exempting cases in which at least two-thirds of the
plaintiff class and primary defendants are citizens of the state in which the action is filed).
165. Specifically, if greater than one-third but fewer than two-thirds of the plaintiff class
and primary defendants are citizens of the state in which the action is filed, the federal court
may, "in the interests of justice" exercise discretion to decline jurisdiction by looking to a
"totality of the circumstances." Id. § 1332(d)(3). Specifically, this test looks to six factors:
(1) whether the suit involves matters of "national or interstate interest"; (2) whether the
claims will be governed by the laws of a state other than those of the forum state; (3)
"whether the class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal
jurisdiction"; (4) whether there is a "distinct nexus" between the forum the case was brought
in and the class members, the alleged harm, or the defendants; (5) whether the aggregate
number of plaintiffs that are citizens of the forum state is substantially larger than any other
state, and the citizenship of other plaintiffs is widely dispersed among other states; and (6)
whether parallel class actions asserting the same or similar claims have recently been filed.
Id.; see S. REP. No. 109-14, at 36-38, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 35-37 (elaborating
on these six factors).
166. See supra notes 147-48 (noting that CAFA applies to "any" civil action that meets
its criteria).
167. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 109-14, at 36, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 35 (also using
nationally distributed pharmaceuticals as an example of a nationally significant case); S.
REP. No. 108-123, 38-39 (2003) (using nationally distributed pharmaceuticals as an example
of a case of "national or interstate interest").
168. See supra notes 125-30 and accompanying text.
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mention of securities class actions to be found in the legislation and its
history is made explicitly to carve out an exemption for certain types of
securities class actions. 169 CAFA expressly enumerates three types of class
actions to which it does not apply, sometimes called the (1) SLUSA (or
covered securities), (2) corporate governance, and (3) securities
exceptions. 170 Under the SLUSA exception, CAFA does not apply to "any
class action that solely involves a claim ... concerning a covered
security."171
Under the securities exception, CAFA does not cover cases that "solely
involv[e]... a claim that relates to the rights, duties (including fiduciary
duties), and obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to any
security." 172 This carve-out for certain securities claims can be explained in
part by the fact that CAFA came at a time that had just witnessed major
corporate frauds. 173 As a result, when CAFA was being debated in
Congress in the wake of these scandals, opponents pointed to the examples
of Enron, Adelphia, and WorldCom as evidence that investors needed more,
or at least not less, protection in the class action context. 174 Arguments
about CAFA are often couched in language that exemplifies the dichotomy
of plaintiff protection versus corporate interests; opponents argue that
federalizing class actions to "appease big business" would reduce plaintiffs'
chances of prevailing and "prevent many with viable claims from filing
individual actions." 175 This concern, at least with respect to securities, was
met with the reassurance that CAFA expressly exempted certain securities
frauds from the legislation.176 However, an examination of the legislative
history preceding these corporate fraud debacles reminds us that the carve-
out for securities fraud class actions was always part of the plan, and thus
169. See infra note 170.
170. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(9); id. § 1453(d) (stating that CAFA does not apply to actions
solely involving a claim (1) "concerning a covered security"; (2) that relates to internal
corporate governance; or (3) relating "to the rights, duties (including fiduciary duties), and
obligations relating to or created by or pursuant to any security").
171. See id. § 1332(d)(9); id. § 1453(d)(1).
172. See id. § 1453(d)(3); see also id. § 1332(d)(9)(C) (the securities exception).
173. See 148 CONG. REc. H838-01, H839 (2002) (statement of Rep. Frost) ("[A]t this
very moment Congress is still trying to figure out how Enron executives managed to
devastate the life savings of thousands of its employees and shareholders .... America has
just witnessed the worst corporate robbery in history ....").
174. See, e.g., 149 CONG. REC. H5281-03, H5289 (2003) (statement of Rep. Sandlin)
("Do the names WorldCom, Enron and Arthur Andersen strike a familiar note?... This act
should be called exactly what it is: the Corporate Wrongdoer Past, Present and Future
Protection Act; and, by the way, do not forget to send the money.").
175. Roether, supra note 151, at 2752.
176. See 148 CONG. REC. H838-01, H840 (2002) (statement of Rep. Pryce) ("Indeed...
securities litigation is carved out entirely by this legislation. It would not cover Enron.");
149 CONG. REc. H5281-03, H5289 (2003) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (responding
that the bill "provides specific exemptions for the removal of class action cases to Federal
court" for the types of wrongdoing mentioned by Representative Sandlin, cited supra note
174); 149 CONG. REC. H5281-03, H5282 (2002) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (pointing
out from the outset that the legislation "specifically excludes a number of Federal securities
and State-based corporate fraud lawsuits").
1456 [Vol. 78
SECURITIES CLASS ACTIONS & CAFA
these scandals could not be the only reason Congress had in mind for the
securities carve out.177  As Congress noted on multiple occasions, it
intended to carve out securities fraud class actions in order to preserve the
"carefully crafted" jurisdictional framework for securities actions already
established by SLUSA.178
The provision excepting certain securities actions from CAFA's reach
has raised issues as to how CAFA's provisions should be construed.
Ultimately, it is unclear whether the legislation as a whole should be read as
a modest attempt to reform class actions or whether Congress intended to
paint with a broad brush. The legislative history lends itself to both
interpretations. On the one hand, congressional reports support the
proposition that CAFA was intended to be a "modest, balanced step that
would address some of the most egregious problems in class action
practice."' 179 CAFA has repeatedly been described as "modest litigation
reform" that "strikes in a narrow and appropriate way."'180 To that end, it
includes a "narrowly-tailored expansion of federal diversity jurisdiction"
and "modest amendments to current removal provisions."' 81  Yet, the
legislative history also states that, "[o]verall, new section 1332(d) is
intended to expand substantially federal court jurisdiction over class
actions. Its provisions should be read broadly, with a strong preference that
interstate class actions should be heard in a federal court if properly
removed by any defendant."' 182 In the same vein, Congress has suggested
that the exemptions to CAFA be construed narrowly; 183 however, it has also
expressed strong intent from the beginning that these exceptions were vital
177. See H.R. REP. No. 106-320, at 3 (1999) (carving out an exemption for class actions
concerning covered securities).
178. S. REP. No. 109-14 (2005), at 50, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 42 ("The
purpose of this provision is to avoid disturbing in any way the federal vs. state court
jurisdictional lines already drawn in the securities litigation class action context by the
enactment of [SLUSA]."); see id. at 49-50, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 46-47 ("In
order to be consistent with the exceptions to federal diversity jurisdiction granted under new
section 1332(d), new subsection 1453(d) provides that the class action removal provisions
shall not apply to claims involving covered securities or corporate governance litigation. In
addition, claims concerning a covered security... are excepted from the class action
removal rule as well. These are essentially claims against the officers of a corporation for a
precipitous drop in the value of stock, based on fraud. Because Congress has previously
enacted legislation governing the adjudication of these claims, it is the Committee's intent
not to disturb the carefully crafted framework for litigating in this context." (footnote
omitted)); see also S. REP. No. 108-123, at 31 (2003) (exempting from its removal reforms
"any securities class action cases governed by [SLUSA] and corporate governance cases").
179. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 5, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 6; see also id. at 27,
reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 27 ("[CAFA] is a modest attempt to address a number of
the problems and abuses in the current class action system.").
180. 151 CONG. REc. H723-01, H727 (2005) (statement of Rep. Boucher).
181. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 27, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 27.
182. Id. at 43, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 41.
183. See, e.g., id. at 45, reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 42 (stating that the securities
exemption is to be "narrowly construed").
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to the legislation. 184 These difficulties in applying CAFA have reared their
heads in the context of the subprime crisis. Part I.E provides an overview
of the subprime crisis and the surrounding circumstances that led to the
conflict at the heart of this Note.
E. The Current Context: A Countrywide Crisis
In order to truly understand how the incongruous removal provisions at
issue are important to the conflict at hand, and to make an informed
assessment as to how they can be reconciled, it is critical to first understand
the context in which the conflict has arisen.
During the year in which CAFA was enacted, Alan Greenspan, then-
Chairman of the Federal Reserve, believed that a "bubble" in the national
housing market was still unlikely to occur despite "froth" in some local
markets. 185 This conjecture was based on the widely held assumption that
housing markets were local-not national-in character. 186  Meanwhile,
investors in mortgage-backed assets relied on this assumption to build
portfolios of what they believed were assets from uncorrelated markets. 187
Paradoxically, it was the very proliferation of these portfolios that generated
correlation in the market, and simultaneously made it easier for buyers with
dubious credit to finance homes they could not afford. 188 "Only once
investors realized that the housing market is a national market-not a local
one-did it become clear that these securities were extraordinarily risky.
Hence the collapse."'189
The subprime meltdown has dominated financial news since early 2007,
when "economic conditions triggered fears of widespread defaults in
subprime mortgages"-the same mortgages that had been credited with
inflating the housing bubble until it popped. 190 Trillions of dollars in losses
were announced as "companies were forced to come to grips with subprime
184. See supra notes 174-77 and accompanying text (discussing the concern over
CAFA's applicability to securities class actions in the wake of corporate scandals such as
Enron).
185. The Economic Outlook. Hearing Before the J. Economic Comm., 109th Cong. 52
(2005) (testimony of Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System) (stating that, "[a]lthough a 'bubble' in home prices for the Nation as a whole does
not appear likely, there do appear to be, at a minimum, signs of froth in some local markets
where home prices seem to have risen to unsustainable levels").
186. See id at 52-53 ("The housing market in the United States is quite heterogeneous,
and it does not have the capacity to move excesses easily from one area to another. Instead,
we have a collection of only loosely connected local markets .... [T]he behavior of home
prices varies widely across the Nation.").
187. See David M. Levy & Sandra J. Peart, An Expert-Induced Bubble: The Nasty Role




190. Patrick R. Costello et al., Important Developments in Securities Litigation in 2008,
36 SEC. REG. L.J. 213, 218 (2008).
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mortgage vulnerability." 91 The national economy has since witnessed
major banks and institutions fail, economies teeter, and stock markets
plummet. 192  The foundering of former pillars of financial strength-
Lehman Brothers, Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch, and AIG-caused investor
confidence in the financial system to plummet, which in turn caused credit
markets to seize up. 193 The subprime crisis quickly turned into the credit
crisis, which led to the global financial crisis. 194
The unprecedented widespread impact of subprime mortgages derives
from several unique features of the subprime financial market. 195 First,
universal expectations that housing prices could only go up facilitated
subprime lending and borrowing for those with bad credit. 196 Due to the
rise in home values, lenders were increasingly willing to lend money to
individuals with low credit scores who were subject to a low level of
income verification. 197 Borrowers thought they were safe in the belief that
they could easily pay off their mortgage by selling off homes they could not
afford at increased values. 198 The subprime loans were attractive to these
191. Id. Securities class actions related to the credit crisis have particularly high investor
losses: in 2008 and 2009 median losses for these cases were over $600 million; total
investor losses were over $450 billion in 2008, and these losses are on pace to surpass $300
billion in 2009. STEPHANIE PLANCICH & SVETLANA STARYKH, NERA, RECENT TRENDS IN
SECURITIES CLASS ACTION LITIGATION: 2009 MID-YEAR UPDATE; FILINGS REMAIN HIGH,
FUELED BY CREDIT CRISIS AND PONZI SCHEME CLAIMS; MEDIAN SETTLEMENTS REMAIN
UNDER $10 MILLION 2 (2009) [hereinafter NERA 2009 STUDY], available at http://www.
nera.com/image/Recent TrendsReport_0709.pdf; see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
2008 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY 3 (2009) [hereinafter PwC 2008 STUDY], available at
http://10b5.pwc.com/PDF/NY-09-0894%20SECURITIES%20LIT%20STUDY%20
FINAL.PDF (noting the loss of "trillions of investor dollars" and that federal resources
committed in 2008 to bail out the financial markets exceed an estimated $6.4 trillion);
Yalman Onaran, Banks' Subprime Losses Top $500 Billion on Writedowns, BLOOMBERG,
Aug. 12, 2008, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aSKLfqh2qd9
o&refer=worldwide; U.S. Banks To Write Down About $44 Billion in Q4: Whitney,
REUTERS, Nov. 26, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/GCACreditCrisis/idUSTRE4AP3Q
Y20081126.
192. See PwC 2008 STUDY, supra note 191, at 2-3, 29 (discussing the demise of mortgage
and financial institutions that failed due to their exposure to mortgage-backed securities,
such as AIG, Lehman Brothers, Bear Steams, and Merrill Lynch); id at 29 (discussing the
dramatic increase in bank failures as the economy worsened in 2008); Carrick Mollenkamp
et al., Crisis on Wall Street as Lehman Totters, Merrill Is Sold, AIG Seeks To Raise Cash,
WALL ST. J., Sept. 15, 2008, at Al; Andrew Ross Sorkin, A Stunning Fall: JPMorgan Chase
Pays Only $2 aSharefor Troubled Firm, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 2008, at Al.
193. See S. REP. No. 111-1, at 188-89 (2009).
194. "'[Ajnnus horribilis' best sums up 2008. It will be remembered as the year in which
the subprime crisis of 2007 evolved into a financial crisis with reverberating effects on
financial markets and economies throughout the world." PwC 2008 STUDY, supra note 191,
at 3.
195. Arthur G. Boylan, The Subprime Mortgage Market: Its Broad Impact and the Initial
Hurdle for Securities Class Actions, FED. LAW., Aug. 2008, at 20, 20.
196. Id.
197. Id. "The availability of easy, cheap credit with low underwriting standards inflated
the demand for housing, which led to increased housing prices." S. REP. No. 111-1, at 187.
198. See Boylan, supra note 195, at 20; Jonathan C. Dickey, Current Trends in Federal
Securities Litigation, in POSTGRADUATE COURSE IN FEDERAL SECURITIES LAW 1011, 1035
(ALI-ABA Course of Study, July 24-25, 2008).
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borrowers-and ultimately fatal to them-because of their exotic features,
such as "teaser" low initial interest rates. 199 However, an unexpected
downturn in the housing market fueled the collapse of subprime lending and
the subprime market. 200 As housing prices declined, borrowers were unable
to sell their homes at prices high enough to pay off their mortgages-
something they had once taken for granted. Meanwhile, as low initial
interest periods expired, subprime loan holders defaulted in record numbers,
forcing some into foreclosure. 20 1
A second feature of the exotic subprime market contributed to the
breadth of the crisis: increased securitization of the subprime loans. 20 2
Securitization is "the process by which banks and lenders pool mortgages
[or other loans] with similar characteristics together, package the loans into
bonds, and ultimately sell them to investors as securities." 20 3  The
mortgage-backed security (MBS) was the most commonly securitized loan,
totaling about $6.1 trillion in the United States in early 2006.204 Traditional
mortgages encompassed "a simple relationship between a bank and a
borrower" in a local market; thus the impact of widespread default and "a
major decline in the housing market would have a much more limited
impact on the overall economy." 20 5  The subprime model, marked by
increased securitization, expanded the impact because many more players
were involved in the complex securitization process and because MBSs
were so widely held. 20 6 While lenders kept some of the bad loans on their
own books, others were pooled together and securitized. 20 7 These MBSs
were structured in multiple levels of "tranches," or mezzanines, according
to their level of risk.208 This layering system allowed for the securities to
obtain higher credit ratings by the ratings agencies than they otherwise
would have.209 As a result, the ratings agencies typically rated MBS
investments in the double-A to triple-A range. 210 In the prosperous housing
climate, this made MBSs an attractive investment for mutual funds, hedge
funds, insurance companies, and corporations. 211 However, when the
199. Boylan, supra note 195, at 20.
200. Id.
201. See Monetary Policy Hearings, supra note 37, at 2 (statement of Sen. Dodd,
Chairman, S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs) (describing the "foreclosure
crisis" that continues to hit record levels: foreclosures for January 2008 were up fifty-seven
percent from 2007 and "over 2 million Americans could lose their homes"); Dickey, supra
note 198, at 1036.
202. Boylan, supra note 195, at 20.
203. Id
204. See S. REP. No. 111-1, at 186 (2009). The mortgage-backed security owed its
explosive growth to the "perception of safety" of this type of loan. Id
205. Boylan, supra note 195, at 20-21.
206. Id; S. REP. No. 111-1, at 187.




211. S. REP. No. 111-1, at 187; Boylan, supra note 195, at 21.
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housing market went belly-up, the value of these securities plummeted. 21 2
The ubiquitous nature of subprime mortgages resulted in a widespread
impact on the national economy; thus many different entities will play a
role in credit crisis litigation. 213
Not surprisingly, in the wake of the credit crisis, a wave-a tsunami,
even-of subprime securities lawsuits has followed.214  Terms such as
MBSs and collateralized debt obligations (CDOs) are now common
parlance amongst the securities bar.215 A majority of the class action cases
have been filed in the Second Circuit. 216
212. S. REP. No. 111-1, at 187; Boylan, supra note 195, at 21.
213. See Costello et al., supra note 190, at 218 (discussing the many players in the
subprime mortgage and MBS business who present various potential targets for litigation);
see also Jonathan C. Dickey et al., Subprime-Related Securities Litigation: Where Do We
Go from Here?, INSIGHTS: CORP. & SEC. L. ADVISOR, Apr. 2008, at 1, 3; Vikas Bajaj, If
Everyone's Finger Pointing, Who's To Blame?, N.Y. TIMEs, Jan. 28, 2008, at CI ("'It will
be a multiring circus .... ' (quoting Joseph A. Grundfest, former SEC Commissioner and
Stanford Law Professor)).
214. See NERA 2009 STUDY, supra note 191, at 1, 3 (noting the surge in federal class
action securities filings driven by the credit crisis, reaching 259 cases in 2008-a six-year
high-and 127 new filings in the first half of 2009); PwC 2008 STUDY, supra note 191, at 5-
6 (counting 210 securities class actions filed in 2008-a majority of which were related to
the financial crisis-representing a twenty-nine percent increase over 2007 and a fifteen
percent increase over the average number of filings since the PSLRA was enacted in 1995);
Costello, supra note 190, at 213, 218 (stating that in the fifteen months ending on March 31,
2008, 448 subprime-related cases were filed, with securities cases accounting for twenty-
three percent of those filings; securities fraud class actions accounted for over half of those
securities filings); The D&O Diary, http://www.dandodiary.com/2007/04/articles/securities-
litigation/counting-the-subprime-lender-lawsuits/ (Apr. 28, 2007, 14:26 EST) (counting 199
subprime lender lawsuits as of Aug. 31, 2009); see also CORNERSTONE STUDY 2007, supra
note 111, at 2, 5; Dickey et al., supra note 213, at 2-3. For the most recently updated Class
Action Filings (CAF) index, see Stanford Securities Class Action Clearinghouse-
Litigation Activity Indices, http://securities.stanford.edu/litigation-activity.html (last visited
Nov. 9, 2009) (counting credit crisis class action filings for 2009 YTD). See also Stanford
Securities Class Action Clearinghouse-Index of Filings, http://securities.stanford.edu/
companies.html (last visited Nov. 9, 2009) (counting all securities class actions by quarter
and court).
215. See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, 2007 SECURITIES LITIGATION STUDY (2008)
[hereinafter PWC STUDY 2007], available at http://I0b5.pwc.com/PDF/2007%20SECURITY
%20LIT%20STUDY%20W-LT.PDF (observing that the most notable development of 2007
was the escalation of the subprime crisis; indeed, the American Dialect Society even voted
"subprime" the Word of the Year for 2007). Some other studies have arrived at differing
numbers due to varied counting methodologies, but agree that the credit crisis has generated
a wealth of securities class action filings. See CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS
ACTION FILINGS: 2009 MID-YEAR ASSESSMENT 2 (2009), available at http://securities.
comerstone.com/pdfs/2009_Mid-YearAssessment.pdf (stating that the majority of
securities class action filings in the first half of 2009 "contained allegations related to the
credit crisis"). Even though the study counted eighty-seven securities class action filings for
the first half of 2009-a 22.3% decrease from the filings in each half of 2008-a substantial
portion continue to be related to the credit crisis. Id. at 2-3. Moreover, this study only tracks
class actions involving exchange-traded securities, which does not include the filings related
to mortgage-backed securities. Id. at 6.
216. See NERA, supra note 191, at 5 (observing that historically, securities class action
filings are concentrated in the Second Circuit and the Ninth Circuit, but credit crisis filings
have been heavily concentrated in the Second Circuit); PwC 2008 STUDY, supra note 191, at
17, 30 (noting that the Second Circuit accounted for the most filings, followed by the Ninth
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Credit crisis class actions include "virtually every type of claim available
under the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of
1934."2 17 Many of the complaints asserting claims of securities fraud
against mortgage lenders allege overstatement of assets, understatement of
loan loss reserves, and lowered underwriting standards to drive loan
origination volume to unqualified borrowers who were likely to default.218
Mortgage lenders and financial institutions have not only found themselves
in federal court as defendants in securities class actions that assert claims
under sections 10(b) and 20 of the '34 Act, but they have also been sued'in
state court by holders of mortgage pass-through certificates claiming
violations of sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the '33 Act based on
misrepresentations and omissions in the offering documents of these
noncovered securities. 219 As compared to other types of securities class
actions, a higher percentage of subprime cases involve claims under the '33
Act.220 Commentators have observed that plaintiffs prefer to sue in state,
rather than federal court. 221 This has been a source of tension in light of
Congress's attempts to concentrate certain class actions in federal court. 222
Plaintiffs in subprime cases have argued that their '33 Act claims can be
brought in state court-and must stay in state court-pursuant to the
nonremoval provision in section 22 of the '33 Act, while defendants seek
removal to federal court based on CAFA's provisions. 223
The next section of this Note examines the conflict over which provision
trumps-the nonremoval provisions of the '33 Act or the removal
provisions of CAFA-in securities class actions, particularly with respect to
Circuit, due to credit crisis-related filings); see also Dickey, supra note 198, at 1033; Dickey
et al., supra note 213, at 2-3.
217. Boylan, supra note 195, at 21.
218. See PwC 2008 STUDY, supra note 191, at 31 ("The nature of the allegations found in
these financial-crisis-related cases ranged from claims of inadequate reserves and
overstatement of assets to inadequate disclosures."); Boylan, supra note 195, at 21
(observing general allegations made in subprime suits); Dickey et al., supra note 213, at 3-4
(discussing theories of liability).
219. See, e.g., Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1032-
33 (9th Cir. 2008) (alleging violations of sections 11, 12(a)(2), and 15 of the '33 Act); N.J.
Carpenters Vacation Fund v. HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581, 582
(S.D.N.Y. 2008) (alleging violations of sections 11, 12, and 15 of the '33 Act);
CORNERSTONE RESEARCH, SECURITIES CLASS ACTION FILINGS: 2008: A YEAR IN REVIEW 21-
22 (2009), available at http://securities.stanford.edu/cleainghouse research/2008 YIR/
20090106 YIR08 Full Report.pdf (noting the share of class actions alleging sections 1 1
and 12(2) claims reached its highest level in 2008); 2 JOSEPH M. MCLAUGHLIN,
MCLAUGHLIN ON CLASS ACTIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE § 12:6, at 743 (5th ed. 2009) (noting
that class actions alleging '33 Act claims regarding noncovered securities, such as mortgage-
backed securities, have multiplied in the wake of the subprime crisis).
220. Costello et al., supra note 190, at 223 (citing James G. Bohn, The Crisis Gets Its
Judicial Legs: A Survey of Subprime Securities Class Actions, 40 SEC. REG. & L. REP. 1178
(2008)).
221. Id. (citing The D&O Diary, http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/07/articles/securities-
litigation/section-11-lawsuits-coming-soon-to-a-state-court-near-you/ (July 21, 2008, 05:09
EST)).
222. See supra Part I.C-D.
223. See The D&O Diary, supra note 221.
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cases involving MBSs. These MBS cases present unique difficulties
because the securities plaintiffs are holders of mortgage pass-through
certificates, which are not covered securities, i.e., the kind of securities
which SLUSA makes removable. 224 Charles Geisst reminds us that, since
1933, "advances in financial innovation, plus the determination of some to
ignore the law, created a situation in which existing regulations proved too
general in the face of an onslaught of new financial products. ' '2 25 SLUSA
did not, in advance of the crisis, provide for the removal of noncovered
securities such as MBSs. Meanwhile, noncovered MBSs indisputably carry
national importance, a concept which goes to the heart of both CAFA and
SLUSA. Nevertheless, CAFA left the language of the '33 Act's
nonremoval provision untouched. To that end, some courts have construed
CAFA's provisions broadly to allow for removal of cases involving such
securities, 226 while others have administered a narrower reading of CAFA's
provisions, and maintain that the more specific '33 Act trumps the general
removal provisions of CAFA.227 Part II explores the current split in the
circuits by examining three recent court decisions, each of which has
employed a different approach to resolve this conflict.
In Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP,228 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the specific nonremoval provision in
section 22 of the '33 Act trumps the general removal provisions of
CAFA.2 29 In contrast, in its decision in New Jersey Carpenters Vacation
Fund v. HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust,230 the U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York held that CAFA trumped the '33 Act
because mortgage-backed securities cases deal with an issue of national
importance-the countrywide credit crisis-and therefore are precisely the
type of cases that Congress intended to be heard in federal court by way of
CAFA.2 31 A few months after New Jersey Carpenters, a decision in the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit created a split in the circuits.
In Katz v. Gerardi,2 32 a case not involving MBSs, 233 Judge Frank
Easterbrook vacated the district court's opinion, which allowed for remand
under Luther, and held instead that a securities class action brought under
the '33 Act may be removed to federal court unless CAFA provides
otherwise in its exceptions. 234 Though Katz did not involve MBSs, the
court held that CAFA does indeed supersede the '33 Act and rejected the
224. See supra notes 121-24 and accompanying text.
225. GEISST, supra note 16, at 290.
226. See, e.g., Katz v. Gerardi, 552 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2009); N.J. Carpenters Vacation
Fund v. HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
227. See, e.g., Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir.
2008).
228. 533 F.3d 1031.
229. Id. at 1032.
230. 581 F. Supp. 2d581.
231. Id. at 587-88.
232. 552 F.3d 558.
233. Id. at 561-62.
234. Id. at 562-63.
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Luther line of reasoning that the '33 Act is more specific than CAFA in
securities cases.2 35 Katz reasoned that in order to give effect to CAFA's
exceptions, CAFA must apply to all class actions-including securities
class actions-but, importantly, the court held that it does not apply to
individual securities actions, which may not be removed to federal court. 2 3 6
Part II will explore the arguments surrounding this split in the circuits.
II. CONFRONTING THE CLASS ACTION CONFLICT
This Part examines the conflict between the nonremoval provision of the
'33 Act and the removal provisions of CAFA in the context of the
mortgage-backed securities crisis. Lawsuits brought under the '33 Act
arising out of the subprime crisis have consistently been initiated in state
court pursuant to section 22 of the '33 Act. Defendants in these cases have
routinely sought to remove these cases to federal court under CAFA.237
Part II.A examines the Ninth Circuit's decision in Luther, which held that
class actions brought under the '33 Act cannot be removed to federal court
because the specific nonremoval provision of the '33 Act trumped the
general removal provisions of CAFA. 238 Part II.B explores a subprime
class action from the Southern District of New York in the Second Circuit,
New Jersey Carpenters, which held that CAFA overrides the '33 Act's
removal provision and that a case may be removed to federal court because
mortgage-backed securities class actions are of national importance. 239
Finally, Part II.C turns to Judge Easterbrook's decision in the Seventh
Circuit case Katz, which held that CAFA allows for removal of all large
class actions meeting certain criteria that do not fall within CAFA's specific
exceptions-including class actions asserting only '33 Act claims-but that
CAFA has no effect on individual securities actions. 240
A. The Ninth Circuit Approach: Luther v. Countrywide
In July 2008, the Ninth Circuit held that a class action brought by holders
of mortgage pass-through certificates alleging violations of the '33 Act was
not removable to federal court, reasoning that the general grant of the right
of removal of high-dollar class actions under CAFA did not trump section
22's specific bar against removal of cases arising under the '33 Act.241
In November 2007, David Luther filed a class action in Los Angeles
County Superior Court against Countrywide Home Loans and its
subsidiaries and affiliates, on behalf of those who acquired hundreds of
235. Id. at 561-62.
236. Id.
237. See The D&O Diary, http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/06/articles/subprime-
litigation/subprime-investors-sue-rating-agency/ (June 8, 2008, 21:09 EST).
238. Id.
239. NJ. Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581.
240. Katz, 552 F.3d 558.
241. Luther, 533 F.3d at 1032. But see infra notes 315-20 and accompanying text
(discussing Judge Frank Easterbrook's criticism of the specificity rationale).
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billions of dollars worth of mortgage pass-through certificates from the
defendant. 242 The action alleged that the defendant violated sections 11,
12(a)(2), and 15 of the '33 Act "by issuing false and misleading registration
statements and prospectus supplements for the mortgage pass-through
certificates." 243  Specifically, the plaintiffs in Luther alleged that the
statements "omitted and misstated the credit worthiness of the underlying
mortgage borrowers," and thus greatly underrepresented the risk of the
investments. 244  This allegedly caused the value of the certificates to
substantially decline since many of the underlying mortgage loans became
uncollectible. 245  The defendant, Countrywide, removed the action to
federal court pursuant to CAFA, but Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer of the U.S.
District Court for the Central District of California granted the plaintiffs
motion to remand the case back to state court, holding that CAFA and the
nonremoval provision of section 22 of the '33 Act "cannot mutually coexist
and that the specific bar against removal in the '33 Act trumps CAFA's
general grant of diversity and removal jurisdiction. ' 246 The Ninth Circuit
allowed Countrywide to appeal this decision.247 On appeal, the Ninth
Circuit held that the pass-through certificates do not fall under the "covered
securities" exception to the nonremoval provision.248 The court rejected
Countrywide's argument that the longstanding nonremoval provision of the
'33 Act was superseded by the more recent statute, CAFA, which was
enacted in 2005.249 The court looked to rules of statutory construction in its
decision. 250 It ultimately relied upon the rule of specificity, a principle of
statutory construction whereby the statute that deals more precisely with the
subject matter trumps the more general statute, rather than the rule of
recency, which defaults to the most recent statute when two statutes are in
conflict. 251 The Ninth Circuit asserted that "'a statute dealing with a
narrow, precise, and specific subject is not submerged by a later enacted
statute covering a more generalized spectrum."' '252 Between the '33 Act
and CAFA, the court found the '33 Act to be the more specific statute since
"it applies to the narrow subject of securities cases and section 22(a) more
precisely applies only to claims arising under the Securities Act of
1933."253 CAFA, by contrast, applies to class actions in general. 254
Therefore, the Luther court concluded that section 22(a) of the '33 Act
242. Luther, 533 F.3d at 1032.
243. Id. at 1032-33.




248. Id. at 1033 n.1
249. Id. at 1033-34.
250. Id. at 1034.
251. Id.
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precluded removal of class actions alleging only violations of the '33
Act. 255
Luther also distinguished itself from Estate of Pew v. Cardarelli,256 a
Second Circuit case from May 2008, in which money market certificate
holders brought an action that was successfully removed under CAFA, on
the grounds that the court in Pew did not proceed under the '33 Act and,
therefore, did not specifically address the interplay between section 22 and
CAFA.2
57
There are other arguments for precluding removal of '33 Act claims
under CAFA, most of which focus on protecting investor plaintiffs. 258
Thomas Lee Hazen has proffered one justification for denying the right of
removal: giving the securities plaintiff an absolute choice of forum
facilitates the plaintiffs ability to enforce his private right of action.259
This is so because state court can prove to be less complex and less costly
to the plaintiff.260  Professor Hazen has argued fervently against
circumscribing the plaintiffs' absolute choice of forum, though he has
conceded the importance of uniform treatment under the securities laws,
and acknowledged that-to some degree-varying state holdings have
compounded the lack of uniformity amongst the circuits and contributed to
uncertainties in the law. 261 While Hazen has stood by Luther in terms of its
255. Id.
256. 527 F.3d 25 (2d Cir. 2008).
257. Luther, 533 F.3d at 1034.
258. The call for increased investor protection has returned in the wake of the practices
that led to the subprime meltdown. See GEISST, supra note 16, at 290 ("But [when]
safeguards were removed.., the whole financial system became vulnerable to the abuses of
the past."); id. at 9 ("The old Progressive arguments [calling for regulation during the 1920s]
still reverberate occasionally when financial scandals erupt, but current thinking considers
regulation and the safeguards it provided as relics of the past. But the emergence of another
major scandal or the failure of a financial institution will quickly bring the arguments back
from the dusty archives and position them center stage in an argument that is certainly not at
an end."). But see ROBERT SOBEL, PANIC ON WALL STREET: A CLASSIC HISTORY OF
AMERICA'S FINANCIAL DISASTERS-WITH A NEW EXPLORATION OF THE CRASH OF 1987, at
501-02 (2d ed. 1988) (cautioning against drawing lessons from the past, and suggesting that
some of the safeguards put into place by the securities laws of the 1930s were obsolete fifty
years later and that future panics require their own analysis, rather than references to FDR
and 1929).
259. See HAZEN, supra note 93, § 7.17[2][B] (arguing that despite the tendency toward
federalizing securities regulation and matters of national interest, denying removal of '33
Act claims is justified because private enforcement is facilitated by giving the plaintiff an
absolute choice of forum).
260. Id. See generally Hazen, supra note 15, at 707 (arguing that "serious consideration
should be given to banning removal"). Thomas Lee Hazen weighs the importance of
providing a remedy for the small investor and the overcrowding of federal courts against
factors such as federal expertise and uniformity of law, but still comes out on the same side
as Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP. Id. Hazen calls for expanding the role
of state courts in hearing claims arising under the federal securities laws-either "by way of
legislative reforms or of increased awareness of injured investors." Id. at 745.
261. Id. at 711.
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ultimate result-precluding removal of '33 Act claims under CAFA262-
others have agreed with the rationale, but not the result, of hearing federal
securities laws claims in state court.263 The next section examines the
approach of the Southern District of New York, which arrived at the
opposite result of the Ninth Circuit in Luther.
B. The Southern District of New York Approach: New Jersey Carpenters v.
HarborView Mortgage
In New Jersey Carpenters, District Judge Harold Baer addressed what
was then an issue of first impression in the Southern District of New
York-whether CAFA overrides the nonremoval provision of the '33
Act.264 In deciding the question that Judge Baer recognized as presenting a
"clear split in the Circuits," the court looked to other Second Circuit
decisions and held that the class action brought by holders of mortgage
pass-through certificates alleging only claims arising under the '33 Act was
removable to federal court under CAFA.2 65
The facts of this case were almost identical to those in Luther. On May
14, 2008, the plaintiffs, led by the New Jersey Carpenters Vacation Fund,
filed a class action in New York State Supreme Court, alleging violations of
sections 11, 12, and 15 of the '33 Act in connection with the issuance of
HarborView Mortgage Loan Pass-Through Certificates. 266 As in Luther,
these mortgage backed securities were collateralized with loans
underwritten by Countrywide. 267 Also as in Luther, these Countrywide
loans were alleged to have been made to "uncreditworthy borrowers." 26 8
The complaint alleged various misrepresentations in the prospectuses and
registration statements of these MBSs, resulting in inflation of the value of
the securities. 269 The complaint also reasoned that New York state court
was the proper jurisdiction and venue in which to hear this case based on
the concurrent jurisdiction provision of section 22 of the '33 Act. 270
262. See HAZEN, supra note 93, § 7.17[2][B] (citing Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans
Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2008)).
263. See, e.g., The D&O Diary, http://www.dandodiary.com/2008/03/articles/subprime-
litigation/subprime-litigation-wave-rolls-on (Mar. 13, 2008, 20:05 EST) ("Given the
language in Section 22(a), Judge Pfaelzer's decision seems correct. However, the outcome
seems undesirable .... It certainly does seem like putting federal securities class actions in
state court opens up a can of worms.").
264. N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. HarborView Mortgage Loan Trust, 581 F. Supp.
2d 581, 582 (S.D.N.Y. 2008).
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Verified Complaint for Violations of Sections 11, 12 and 15 of the Securities
Act of 1933 at 3, N.J. Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581 (No. 08cv05093(HB)).
268. See id. at 29 ("In or around early 2007, disclosures began to emerge that revealed
that investment banks and home loan lenders had issued billions of dollars of mortgage
backed securities collateralized with home loans which were made to uncreditworthy
borrowers, significantly inflating the value of those securities. At the center of these
predatory lending practices was the world's largest mortgage lender, Countrywide.").
269. See id.
270. Id. at 5.
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Additionally, many of the acts and transactions alleged occurred in
substantial part in New York County; the securities offerings were actively
marketed and sold in the county; and many of the named defendants
maintained principal offices and residences in the county. 271  The
defendants named in the case-HarborView (the issuer), as well as
depositors, investment banks, and credit rating agencies-removed the case
to the Southern District of New York pursuant to CAFA. 272 The plaintiffs
moved to remand the case back to state court based on section 22(a)'s
nonremoval provision, arguing that the '33 Act expressly granted the
plaintiffs the right to choose its forum,273 citing Luther.274  In the
alternative, the plaintiffs argued that even if CAFA did override the '33
Act, the case fell under CAFA's exception for securities, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(9)(c). 275 However, the plaintiffs contended that in order to
override the '33 Act, the defendants must successfully argue that CAFA
implicitly repealed SLUSA's amendments to the removal provisions of
section 22(a). 276 The plaintiffs cited to CAFA's legislative history, which
they argued "evidences an intent to address abuses wholly unrelated to
securities class actions and leave 'undisturbed' the SLUSA
amendments." 277
The defendants contended that the Ninth Circuit's decision in Luther was
not controlling in light of the Second Circuit's decision in California Public
Employees' Retirement System v. WorldCom, Inc. ,278 which held that the
removal provisions of the Bankruptcy Code overrode the antiremoval
provision of the '33 Act.279 The defendants further contended that the
conflicting language of the '33 Act and CAFA brought the statutory
construction "Rule of Recency" into play and thus CAFA, which was
passed in 2005, should control over the '33 Act.280
The district court denied the motion to remand the case back to state
court.28 1 In Estate of Pew v. Caradelli,282 the Second Circuit found
CAFA's language to be ambiguous, particularly with respect to the
exceptions to removal, and thus chose to read the language of CAFA
271. Id.
272. N.J. Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 582.
273. See Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Support of Its Motion to Remand at 8, N.J.
Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581 (No. 08-5093-HB) (asserting that in the '33 Act, "Congress
expressly authorized aggrieved investors to bring claims under the Securities Act in either
state or federal court").
274. N.J. Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 582.
275. Id. at 585.
276. Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum of Law in Further Support of Its Motion to Remand
at 5-7, N.J. Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581 (No. 08-5093-HB).
277. Id.
278. 368 F.3d 86 (2d Cir. 2004).
279. Defendant's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion to Remand at
10-14, N.J Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581 (No. 08-5093-HB) (citing WorldCom, 368 F.3d
86 (2d Cir. 2004)).
280. N.J. Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 586.
281. Id. at 582.
282. 527 F.3d 25, 30 (2d Cir. 2008).
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together with the statutory context and legislative history; the district court
followed suit.283 Based on the '33 Act alone, the case could not have been
removed to federal court because it did not involve "covered securities,"
and thus did not fall under SLUSA's amendment to the nonremoval
provision.284 However, the court recognized that, on their face, section
22(a) of the '33 Act and CAFA are in direct conflict with one another, and
CAFA-which was enacted in 2005-would allow for the case to be
removed.285 The court looked to the purposes of SLUSA and CAFA, both
of which sought to concentrate class actions in federal court.286 The court
interpreted CAFA's language to create "original jurisdiction for and
removability of all class actions that meet the minimal requirements and do
not fall under one of the limited exceptions. '287
The court pointed to portions of CAFA's legislative history expressing
congressional intent for cases involving issues of "national concern" that
have "national consequences" to be heard in federal court, rather than in a
"magic" state jurisdiction.288 While the court conceded that this concern
was not present in this case since New York is not one of the notorious
"magic jurisdictions," it found the "national" importance factor
compelling. 289 The brunt of the court's decision therefore appeared to rely
on the fact that the case addressed "head on an issue of national, if not
global, importance-the mortgage-backed securities crisis. '"290
The court disagreed with the plaintiffs argument that the court should
follow the Ninth Circuit's decision in Luther-that the specificity of the
nonremoval provision of the '33 Act overrides the general removal
provision of CAFA. 291 The court was persuaded by the Second Circuit's
decision in WorldCom, which reconciled the conflicting removal provisions
of the Bankruptcy Code with nonremoval provisions of the '33 Act.2 92 In
WorldCom, both of the provisions of the conflicting statutes were found to
be "specific and narrowly-tailored. '293 The WorldCom court found the
283. N.J. Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 584 & n.2 (citing Pew, 527 F.3d at 30); see also
2 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 219, § 12:6, at 727 (observing that CAFA's poor draftsmanship
has led some courts to look to its legislative history).
284. N.J Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 583.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 583 n. 1 (stating that the SLUSA amendment providing for removal of covered
securities was meant to close up loopholes left by the PSLRA, which sought to "stem the
tide of private securities fraud.., actions in State rather than federal court," and that CAFA
expanded federal diversity jurisdiction in order to allow "certain class actions that are
national or international in scope" to be brought or removed to federal court).
287. Id. at 584.
288. Id. (citing 151 CONG. REc. S1086-01, $1103 (2005) (statement of Sen. Grassley)).
289. Id. at 585.
290. Id. ("Given the scale of damages and the vital importance of the issues raised by the
case to the national economy, this case fits easily within the goals expressed in the debates
that resulted in CAFA legislation.").
291. Id. at 586.
292. Id. at 586-87 (citing Cal. Pub. Employees' Ret. Sys. v. WorldCom, Inc., 368 F.3d 86
(2d Cir. 2004)).
293. Id. at 586.
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central purpose of the Bankruptcy Code to centralize bankruptcy litigation
in a federal forum to be compelling; thus this purpose overrode the
nonremoval provision of the '33 Act.294 Furthermore, the general removal
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), expressly allows for exceptions "as otherwise
expressly provided by Act of Congress" to legislate around the general right
of removal; whereas the bankruptcy removal provision is intentionally
sweeping in scope and does not contain any limiting language. 295 The court
compared CAFA to the Bankruptcy Code, reasoning both have "sweeping
removal power" and the "sole limitations are those exclusively listed in the
defined exceptions. '296
Finally, in determining whether CAFA should override the '33 Act, the
court found the Second Circuit's decision in Pew to be the most compelling
case.297 Pew addressed both CAFA and SLUSA with respect to removal
and found "'an overall design to assure that the federal courts are available
for all securities cases that have national impact (including those that
involve securities traded on national exchange).' ' 298 In light of the Second
Circuit's findings, the court held that CAFA did override the '33 Act's
nonremoval provision "because this case involves exactly the type of case
CAFA was concerned about-a large, non-local securities class action
dealing with a matter of national importance, the mortgage-backed
securities crisis that is currently wreaking havoc with the national and
international economy." 299
Having held that CAFA's removal provisions overrode the '33 Act, the
court then turned to CAFA's exceptions to removal under
§ 1332(d)(9)(C). 300 The court looked once again to CAFA's legislative
history, and found that Congress intended for CAFA's provisions to be
294. Id. at 586-87 (citing WorldCom, 368 F.3d 86); see also City of Ann Arbor
Employees' Ret. Sys. v. Citigroup Mortgage Loan Trust, Inc., 572 F. Supp. 2d 314
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (class action suit involving mortgage pass-through certificates alleging
claims under the '33 Act, citing WorldCom for the proposition that the Bankruptcy Code's
sweeping removal provisions override the '33 Act's antiremoval provision).
295. N.J. Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 587 (citing WorldCom, 368 F.3d at 106).
296. Id. The court also suggested that if Congress wanted to treat CAFA like the general
removal statute rather than the sweeping bankruptcy statute, it could have done so by adding
similar limiting language. Id.; see also Joseph M. McLaughlin, Directors' and Officers'
Liability: Resolving Tension Between CAFA and SLUSA, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 14, 2008, at 5.
Joseph McLaughlin argues that WorldCom's reasoning applies equally to CAFA removal
and draws a parallel from the Bankruptcy Code to CAFA. Id. (citing Radzanower v. Touche
Ross & Co., 426 U.S. 148, 156 (1976), for the proposition that section 22 of the '33 Act
could potentially interfere with the operation of the Bankruptcy Code and, therefore, it
should not control).
297. N.J. Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d. at 587 (citing Estate of Pew v. Caradelli, 527 F.3d
25 (2d Cir. 2008)).
298. Id. (quoting Pew, 527 F.3d at 32).
299. Id. at 587-88; see also McLaughlin, supra note 296 (arguing that a "putative class
action alleging violations of the federal securities law is exactly the type of case Congress
intended federal courts to decide"). McLaughlin argues that the Ninth Circuit's decision in
Luther "frustrated congressional intent" to authorize federal jurisdiction over class actions
alleging '33 Act claims concerning noncovered securities. Id.
300. N.J. Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
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interpreted broadly and for its exceptions to be construed narrowly. 30 1 The
court also looked again to Pew, in which the Second Circuit held that
CAFA's securities exception in § 1332(d)(9)(C) should "not be read
broadly to cover all securities related claims" because that would render
meaningless the terms of the other securities exceptions, such as the
§ 1332(d)(9)(A) exception for covered securities. 30 2 Joseph McLaughlin
has posited that since Congress declined to incorporate into CAFA an
exception preserving the nonremovability of '33 Act claims involving
noncovered securities, such as the ones at issue in New Jersey Carpenters,
it is proper to infer "a clear intent to make such claims removable if they
meet CAFA's jurisdictional criteria." 30 3 The New Jersey Carpenters court
held that since, under Pew, the exception did not apply to "securities fraud
claims like the ones alleged here," and since the claims did not implicate the
terms or meaning of the pass-through certificates, no exceptions to CAFA
applied in this case.304 Thus, since the court found that CAFA trumped the
nonremoval provision of section 22(a) of the '33 Act, and no exceptions to
CAFA's provisions applied, the case could be heard in federal court.30 5
Because this pretrial decision involved a matter of first impression, Judge
Baer authorized the plaintiffs to ask the Second Circuit for an immediate
appeal, but the parties subsequently stipulated to dismiss the appeal with
prejudice. 306
C. The Seventh Circuit Approach: Katz v. Gerardi
Judge Easterbrook rang in 2009 with a decision that created an official
split in the circuits over the removal conflict in Katz.30 7 Though Katz did
not involve MBSs, it concluded that the case was removable under CAFA,
despite section 22's removal bar.308 The plaintiffs in Katz, holders of units
in a real estate investment trust (REIT), filed a class action in state court
invoking only '33 Act claims. 309 The defendant removed the suit to federal
court pursuant to CAFA and the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Illinois remanded the action to state court, holding that section
22(a) is more specific than CAFA because it deals only with securities
301. Id. (citing S. REP. No. 109-14, at 45 (2005), reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4, 42).
302. Id. at 589 (citing Pew, 527 F.3d at 31).
303. 2 McLAUGHLIN, supra note 219, § 12:6, at 744.
304. N.J. Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d at 590.
305. Id.
306. Stipulation to Dismiss Appeal with Prejudice Pursuant to Fed. R. App. P. 42(b), N.J.
Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d 581 (No. 08-4861-cv).
307. 552 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2009).
308. Id. Compare this to NJ. Carpenters, which, in no uncertain terms, found it
significant that the case arose out of the subprime crisis. N.J. Carpenters, 581 F. Supp. 2d at
587-88 ("CAFA overrides the Securities Act's anti-removal provision because this case
involves exactly the type of case CAFA was concerned about-a large, non-local securities
class action dealing with a matter of national importance, the mortgage-backed securities
crisis that is currently wreaking havoc with the national and international economy.").
309. Katz, 552 F.3d at 559-60.
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litigation, while CAFA covers many different varieties of class actions. 310
The court found that section 22 "clearly indicates Congress's intent to have
such actions heard in state court if they were initially filed there."'311 On
appeal, the court addressed whether or not the complaint involving REITs
was artfully pleaded under the '33 Act in order to take advantage of section
22's nonremoval provision.312 The court decided to give the plaintiffs the
benefit of the doubt and assumed that the complaint was not merely artful
pleading, turning instead to "whether § 22(a) insulates all claims under the
1933 Act from removal under [CAFA]." 313 The court stated that section 22
and CAFA could not be reconciled, and usually the more recent law trumps
the older law. 314 The court took issue with the Ninth Circuit's rationale in
Luther, which departed from the rule of recency and instead focused on the
concept of specificity.315 The Katz court pointed out that specific statutes
only trump more general statutes when one is a subset of the other, and
section 22 of the '33 Act is not a subset of CAFA. 316 Although the '33 Act
applies only to securities actions, it applies to both individual investor
lawsuits as well as class actions-both small and large.317 CAFA, on the
other hand, addresses only large, multistate class actions.318 This begs the
question, "Is the 1933 Act more specific because it deals only with
securities law, or is [CAFA] more specific because it deals only with
nationwide class actions? '319 The court rejected the specificity rationale
and looked instead to the language of CAFA.320 The court read § 1453(b)
to allow removal of any class action that meets the criteria of CAFA ("100
investors, $5 million in controversy, minimal diversity") and does not fall
under one of the exceptions under § 1453(d). 321 The Katz court reasoned
that the Luther approach failed to consider CAFA's exceptions, thus
rendering them superfluous. 322 Given the existence of the carve-outs, Katz
held that CAFA applies to all class actions that meet CAFA's criteria-
including securities actions-subject to the limited exceptions in
310. See Katz v. Gerardi, No. 08-CV-04035, 2008 WL 4376815, at *4 (N.D. I11. Sept. 23,
2008), vacated, 552 F.3d 558 (7th Cir. 2009).
311. Id. The district court relied on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit's
reasoning in Luther to hold that '33 Act violations are not removable under CAFA. Id.
312. Katz, 552 F.3d at 560-61.
313. Id. at 561.
314. Id. ("[O]ne or the other must yield.").
315. Id. at 561-62; see also 2 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 219, § 12:6, at 741-42 (rejecting
the specificity argument put forth in Luther and arguing that CAFA is more specific than the
'33 Act because the nonremoval provision of the '33 Act deals with all "cases" arising under
the '33 Act, while CAFA only deals with a subset of those cases-securities class actions).
316. Katz, 552 F.3d at 561. "For example, if [CAFA] dealt with all civil suits, then a law
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§ 1453(d).323 Moreover, McLaughlin maintains that the Ninth Circuit's
approach in Luther "prunes CAFA in a manner that frustrates clearly
expressed congressional intent, which the Second Circuit recognized in
[Pew] was to confer 'federal courts jurisdiction over all class actions (with
regard to securities and otherwise) over $5 million in the aggregate if the
class members are largely out of state.' '"324
In Public Employees' Retirement System of Mississippi v. Morgan
Stanley,325 Judge Pfaelzer of the Central District of California-the judge
who allowed for remand in Luther-had occasion to comment on the
continuing validity of Luther after Katz.326 In a class action arising out of
the mortgage-backed securities crisis, the plaintiffs took the somewhat
unorthodox step 327 of filing in California state court. 328 When defendants
removed the action to federal court, the plaintiffs moved to remand under
Luther.329 This, coupled with the fact that the action alleged only '33 Act
violations, lends itself to the suggestion that the plaintiffs engaged in forum
shopping solely to take advantage of Luther's view of removal, a view
which is unavailable in the Southern District of New York.330 As a result,
Judge Pfaelzer granted the defendant's motion to transfer to the Southern
District of New York. 331 While Judge Pfaelzer declined to rule on the
remand issue, she did acknowledge in dicta that the defendants questioned
Luther's continued validity, pointing to Katz, which addressed arguments
that the Luther court did not expressly consider.332 The Seventh Circuit in
Katz rejected Luther's holding without dissent and circulated the opinion
before it was released to all judges in active service; none favored a hearing
en banc. 333 Judge Pfaelzer did not rule on whether removal under CAFA
was improper in light of Katz but, notably, she did state that the
"[d]efendants appear[ed] to have nonfrivolous arguments for a change in
the law due to post-Luther developments. '334 This case is evidence that the
time is ripe for such a change in the law to come, perhaps from the Supreme
Court. 3 3 5 Indeed, this case is emblematic of the need for resolution, first,
because of the need for unitary federal law, particularly with respect to the
323. Id. at 562-63.
324. 2 MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 219, § 12:6, at 750-51 (quoting Estate of Pew v.
Caradelli, 527 F.3d 25, 32 (2d Cir. 2008)).
325. 605 F. Supp. 2d 1073 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
326. See generally id.
327. See supra note 216 and accompanying text (discussing the concentration of credit
crisis filings in the Second Circuit).
328. Pub. Employees, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
329. Id.
330. Id. at 1075.
331. Id.
332. Id. at 1074.
333. Id.
334. Id. at 1075 n.1.
335. McLaughlin points out that in recent years the Supreme Court has answered several
questions on jurisdiction, "on each occasion in favor of broader federal jurisdiction." 2
MCLAUGHLIN, supra note 219, § 12:6, at 751.
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nationwide credit crisis, 336 and, second, because it is now apparent that the
very thing that the PSLRA, SLUSA, and CAFA sought to prevent-forum
shopping-is being perpetuated by this split in the circuits. 337  Part III
argues that the Seventh Circuit approach is superior in light of the historical
purposes behind both CAFA and the '33 Act, and in light of the current
countrywide credit crisis.
III. KATZ: THE KEY TO CLARITY AND CONSISTENCY
Part III analyzes the divergent approaches to the removal conflict
between the '33 Act and CAFA in light of the credit crisis and argues that
the Seventh Circuit's approach is superior because it gives full effect to the
statutory text, satisfies the historical purposes of CAFA, the '33 Act, the
PSLRA, and SLUSA, and creates consistency by removing these cases into
federal court. Part III.A argues that the Seventh Circuit approach gives full
effect to the provisions of both CAFA and the '33 Act. Part III.B argues
that this approach is true to the historical purposes of both CAFA and the
'33 Act, as well as the PSLRA and SLUSA. Part III.C argues that
comporting with the Seventh Circuit approach allows for the most
consistent result in light of the current credit crisis: federal court should be
the primary venue for class actions that implicate securities of national
importance.
A. Unlocking CAFA and Concurrent Jurisdiction: Understanding
the False Dichotomy
At first blush, CAFA and the '33 Act present a false dichotomy-
examining the two in the context of class actions, Judge Easterbrook is
correct in that "one or the other must yield," 338 but the two are not mutually
exclusive. 339 To say that CAFA "trumps" or overrides the '33 Act, or vice
versa,340 is to overstate the case. 34 1 CAFA overrides the '33 Act in the
336. Pub. Employees, 605 F. Supp. 2d at 1075 (."[A]lthough federal courts sometimes
arrive at different constructions of federal law, federal law... is supposed to be unitary."'
(alteration in original) (quoting Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 40 (2d Cir. 1993))).
337. Judge Mariana R. Pfaelzer stated that the only reason the plaintiffs sued in California
state court was to avoid the precedent set by New Jersey Carpenters in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York. Id. She asserted in dicta that "'no litigant has a
right to have the interpretation of one federal court rather than that of another' ....
'[F]ederal law ... is supposed to be unitary."' Id. (second omission in original) (quoting
Menowitz, 991 F.2d at 40).
338. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
339. See supra text accompanying note 246 (quoting from Luther the viewpoint that the
nonremoval provision of the '33 Act and the removal provision of CAFA "cannot mutually
coexist"); cf supra text accompanying note 285 (describing the standpoint of the Southern
District of New York, that-on their faces-section 22(a) of the '33 Act and CAFA are in
direct conflict with one another).
340. See, e.g., Luther v. Countrywide Home Loans Servicing LP, 533 F.3d 1031, 1033
(9th Cir. 2008).
341. See supra notes 316-20 and accompanying text.
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context of large, nationwide class actions. 342 But CAFA does not have any
effect on smaller securities actions brought by individual investors. 343 In
Katz, Judge Easterbrook acknowledged this critical result and admonished
Luther's specificity argument.344 The '33 Act is not more specific than
CAFA because of the narrower set of cases to which it applies-only
securities cases. Indeed, under this construction, CAFA may even be said
to be the more specific statute, since it deals only with certain procedural
categories. 345  Reading one statute to trump the other creates a false
dichotomy between broadly providing for removal346 and broadly providing
for investor protections.347 The key to clarity is to read CAFA to apply to
all class actions-but for its specific exceptions-and only to class actions.
The former piece of the equation-broadly providing for removal of
countrywide class actions and giving full effect to each of CAFA's specific
exceptions-is critical to clarifying CAFA. First of all, CAFA's legislative
history repeatedly emphasizes its broad purpose of federalizing all
nationwide class actions. 348 As Judge Easterbrook observed in Katz, the
Luther decision is problematic because it failed to acknowledge the
existence of CAFA's exceptions, rendering them superfluous. 349 Indeed,
Judge Pfaelzer, the district judge who decided Luther, admitted as much in
Public Employees '.350 The superior reading of CAFA is the one that gives
effect to the whole statute-including its limited exceptions-as opposed to
the interpretation that would sooner not examine the limited nature of these
exceptions. 351 The fact that Congress was inclined to carve out three
specific exceptions to CAFA, but declined to include such an exception for
section 22 of the '33 Act, is informative. 352 This omission tells us that,
342. See supra notes 28, 145, 147-48, 166, 286-87, 303, 318, 321 and accompanying
text.
343. See supra text accompanying notes 317-18.
344. See supra notes 315-20 and accompanying text.
345. See supra note 315.
346. See supra text accompanying note 182.
347. See supra text accompanying note 54.
348. See supra notes 28, 145, 147-48, 166, 182, 286-87, 318, 321 and accompanying
text.
349. See supra text accompanying notes 321-23.
350. See supra text accompanying notes 326, 333.
351. See supra notes 300, 302-05 and accompanying text (N.J. Carpenters examining
CAFA's exceptions); supra notes 322-23 and accompanying text (Katz noting Luther's
failure to examine CAFA's exceptions); supra note 332 (Public Employees' noting that
Luther failed to address certain arguments examined by the Katz court).
352. Congressional reports evince the intent to exclude only certain securities actions
from CAFA's reaches. See supra notes 169-74 and accompanying text; supra notes 178-79
and accompanying text (noting that SLUSA and corporate governance cases were carved out
because there was already a specific law applying to them); supra note 183 and
accompanying text (stating that the securities exceptions are to be narrowly construed);
supra text accompanying note 287 (recognizing federal court as the proper forum for all
cases not falling under one of CAFA's exceptions); supra note 296 and accompanying text
(discussing CAFA's exclusively defined exceptions); supra text accompanying note 301
(noting the narrow limitations under CAFA); supra note 302 and accompanying text (noting
that Pew interpreted CAFA's exceptions narrowly, holding that CAFA's securities exception
2009] 1475
FORDHAMLA W REVIEW
even in light of Congress's acute awareness of the financial scandals
surrounding Enron, Congress did not deem it necessary to single out '33
Act class actions for continued protection under section 22.353 This was so
in spite of the fact that investor protections typically increase during times
of financial scandal. 354
The latter piece of the equation is crucial to understand the false
dichotomy: CAFA does not supplant the '33 Act and its pro-plaintiff
protections; it strikes in a "narrow and appropriate way" 355 by only
affecting class actions of national importance, 356 and not smaller cases by
investors who are still afforded the choice of state or federal court. 357
Congress failed to carve out of CAFA the concurrent jurisdiction of '33 Act
class actions during a time in recent financial history when investor
protection was of heightened priority. 358 From this we can infer that
Congress did not view the removal of '33 Act class actions as overriding
the measure of protection offered by section 22 because it left untouched
individual claims under the '33 Act, which are still afforded the protection
of concurrent jurisdiction.359 CAFA sought to strike a balance between
protecting investors' access to private rights of action 360 by leaving
individual actions untouched and maintaining confidence in the markets by
removing abuses of the class action tool. 361 The two interests are not
dichotomous, but rather they are inextricably intertwined with the concept
of confidence. 362 After all, history reminds us that the purpose of investor
protection under the federal securities laws is indeed the need for
confidence in the markets. 363
"should not be read broadly to cover all securities related claims," because doing so would
render the other exceptions meaningless); supra text accompanying note 303 (describing
McLaughlin's conclusion that since Congress declined to incorporate into CAFA an
exception preserving the nonremovability of '33 Act claims involving noncovered securities,
it is proper to infer "a clear intent to make such claims removable if they meet CAFA's
jurisdictional criteria"); supra text accompanying note 323.
353. See supra notes 174-76, 184 and accompanying text.
354. See supra notes 16-23 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 179-81 and accompanying text.
356. See supra notes 145, 147, 148, 157-63, 286, 288, 298-99, 324 and accompanying
text.
357. See supra notes 130, 317-18 and accompanying text.
358. See supra notes 174-76, 184 and accompanying text.
359. See supra notes 130, 317-18 and accompanying text.
360. See supra notes 10-12, 20, 54, 63-68, 74, 79, 81, 111-12, 141, 258-60, 273 and
accompanying text.
361. See supra notes 4, 15, 75-77, 83, 85, 87-90 and accompanying text.
362. See supra notes 16, 18-19, 36, 39, 80-81, 110-11, 174-75, 258 and accompanying
text.
363. See supra notes 6, 19-20, 22, 50, 54, 80-81, 84-85 and accompanying text.
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B. Reconciling the Past-Present Paradox: The Flow of Investor Protection
in the Current Crisis
Confidence in the markets and investor protection go hand in hand. 364
Recognizing the false dichotomy between protection of investor plaintiffs
and economic growth is key to unscrambling the ostensible incongruity
between the historical purposes of the '33 Act and the current desire to hear
class actions implicating the subprime crisis in federal court. 365 Indeed, the
'33 Act is a consumer protection Act at heart.3 66 It was carefully crafted3 67
to take the unusual step of providing for concurrent jurisdiction 368 so that
plaintiffs with viable claims would not be deterred from seeking recourse
because they could not afford federal court.369 However, the '33 Act must
not be read in a vacuum; it must be read in conjunction with the securities
framework as a whole, including the PSLRA and SLUSA. At the time of
the '33 Act's passage, viable individual claims were conspicuously absent
from courts, a concern that led to conferring concurrent jurisdiction under
section 22; this stands in marked contrast to the litigious nature of investors
in recent history and the concomitant abuses of the class action system that
undermined the securities framework. 370 Both extremes are damaging to
confidence, and thus legislation from both distant past ('33 Act) and recent
history (PSLRA, SLUSA, CAFA) needs to be remembered when
interpreting historical purposes. 37 1 Furthermore, while it is instructive to
look to the past, the concerns of the present should not be drowned in those
of the past.372 This point figures prominently in the unpacking of the
364. The purpose of providing sturdy protections for investors is to maintain confidence
in the integrity of the markets, so that investors will be encouraged to invest, knowing that
they will be provided with meaningful recourse if they are defrauded. History, however, has
also taught us that overly broad access to private rights of action enable abusive lawsuits,
and undermine the very confidence that private rights of action were created to maintain. See
supra notes 19-20, 22, 50, 54, 80-81, 84-85 and accompanying text.
365. "The brewing legislative battle recalls the industry's reluctance to accept reforms
after the 1929 stock-market crash." Bradley Keoun & Jonathan D. Salant, Obama Plan Gets
Wary Reception from Banks, Lawmakers (Update]), BLOOMBERG.COM, June 18, 2009,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=ae85nCexFOvO (paraphrasing
Charles Geisst, Professor, Manhattan College). "'I don't think anyone can buy the argument
that by regulating too tightly, we'll choke off capitalism .... That argument is as shallow
now as it was then."' Id. (quoting Charles Geisst).
366. See supra notes 10-12, 20, 54, 63-68, 74, 77, 79, 81, 111-12, 141, 258-60, 273 and
accompanying text.
367. See supra notes 56-60, 76 and accompanying text.
368. See supra notes 11-15, 72 and accompanying text.
369. See supra notes 65, 67, 77, 112, 259-60 and accompanying text.
370. See supra notes 65, 86-88 and accompanying text.
371. See GEISST, supra note 16, at 9 ("[B]eing ignorant of the distant past is
understandable. Being ignorant of recent history is unforgiveable.").
372. It is important to realize that, despite the many parallels to the Great Depression, the
credit crisis is its own crisis. While history is certainly instructive, relying upon historical
lessons is not a panacea for the problems of the present. See SOBEL, supra note 258, at 502
("Worse than failing to understand history is to believe that it contains specific messages
that, if applied, can resolve current problems favorably. Alas, there are no such magic
formulas.").
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current credit crisis because of the many disturbing parallels that can be
drawn to the egregious abuses of the 1920s and the Great Depression. 373
However, Justice William 0. Douglas's prescient words of wisdom caution
against "turn[ing] our steps to the past, forgetful of the realities of the
present. ' 374  It is crucial to apply a resolution to the current conflict
"consistently with the other integral parts of the total programme rather than
to resist the relentless tide of events and to seek a return to conditions which
have been wiped out in the forward sweep of our economic and social
life." 375 In this case, the other parts of the investor protection program must
be read to include the PSLRA, SLUSA, and CAFA. To read the '33 Act
any other way would merely delay resolution of this conflict and restoration
of confidence.
C. Opening the Federal Court Door for Countrywide Class Actions
While on the surface Luther appears to be the most protective of
investors because it allows for cases to stay in state courts, upon deeper
inspection it is not necessarily better for investors. It is actually
problematic for investors who may benefit from protection in the form of
consistency. Consistency and fairness would be achieved on two levels:
first, hearing cases involving nationally important securities in federal court
will bring uniformity to national policy; and, second, by following the
Seventh Circuit approach, federal court decisions will be uniform resulting
in fairness to parties regardless of the court they file in.
Although SLUSA only provided for the removal of "covered
securities," 376 the exotic nature of MBSs underscores that not all securities
that are of national importance are nationally traded and predictable in
advance of legislation.377 Given SLUSA's purposes of sweeping certain
nationwide securities class actions into federal court, 378 the result under
Luther is anomalous. 379  Mortgage-backed securities are currently of
national importance and wreaking havoc on the global economy. 380 The
focus on the current problem compels us to keep the unique nature of the
credit crisis in mind, despite its many parallels to the Great Depression.
Courts, including the Southern District of New York, have found this
rationale compelling. 381 New Jersey Carpenters, though it is a district court
373. This ominous sense of parallel to the 1929 crash is not a new phenomenon; Geisst
observed that in the late 1990s "anecdotal evidence was beginning to show disturbing
parallels with the years preceding the 1929 Crash.. . . The pressing question [was] ...
whether the past was bound to repeat itself." GEISST, supra note 4, at 374.
374. See Douglas, Protecting the Investor, supra note 9, at 533.
375. Id.
376. See supra notes 132-33, 137 and accompanying text.
377. See supra note 225 and accompanying text (describing Geisst's observation that
existing regulations sometimes prove too general for innovative financial products).
378. See supra Part IC; supra notes 136, 139, 157, 286, 298 and accompanying text.
379. See supra notes 263, 324 and accompanying text.
380. See supra Part I.E; supra notes 289-90, 299 and accompanying text.
381. See supra Part 1.E; supra notes 289-90, 299 and accompanying text.
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decision, is persuasive because of its proximity to the issues implicated in
the current crisis.38 2 The Southern District of New York is located in the
Second Circuit, where the mortgage-backed securities class actions are most
heavily concentrated. 383 The fact that the Second Circuit has not had
occasion to weigh in on the conflict has led parties to argue for
interpretations under the Ninth or Seventh Circuit. While the Seventh
Circuit directly addresses the interplay of the '33 Act and CAFA, Katz itself
does not involve the type of securities implicated in the current credit
crisis.384 In fact, the '33 Act claims asserted by the plaintiffs in Katz
involved REITs, and the court gave the plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt as
to the propriety of pleading under the '33 Act altogether. 385 However, it is
precisely this type of artful pleading under the '33 Act that underscores the
old arguments for securities class action reform: the forum shopping that
SLUSA and CAFA were concerned with is still alive and well, calling for
broad removal provisions to balance investor protection with the need to
prevent abuses of the securities system. Katz is a prime example of cases
that do not implicate the types of investors contemplated by the '33 Act:
small, individual investors defrauded amidst financial crisis and in need of
wide remedies.3 86  Public Employees', in which the plaintiffs filed in
California in order to take advantage of Luther and avoid the precedent of
New Jersey Carpenters, highlights how the split in authority is actually
perpetuating the problem of forum shopping.38
7
The causes and the symptoms of this conflict in authority have become
circular. The same concerns behind the ostensibly irreconcilable statutes at
issue-forum shopping and investor protection-are now becoming
symptoms of the inconsistency with which courts have interpreted the
interplay of these statutes. Thus, this Note concludes that courts should
follow the Seventh Circuit's approach in the interests of consistency and
clarity. A resolution of the circuit split will achieve consistency in terms of
uniformity of national policy and with respect to the purposes of the past
and present application of federal securities laws.
CONCLUSION: A CONFLICT RIPE FOR RESOLUTION
Amidst the surge of credit crisis class actions, this removal conflict is
ripe for resolution. As the subprime crisis rolls on, the waves of securities
litigation are likely to keep crashing down. 388 The tension between CAFA
and the '33 Act is likely to continue as defrauded investors seek meaningful
382. See supra notes 271, 289 and accompanying text.
383. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
384. See supra note 308 and accompanying text.
385. See supra notes 312-13 and accompanying text.
386. See supra note 54 and accompanying text.
387. See supra notes 328-30 and accompanying text.
388. See, e.g., Costello, supra note 190, at 224 ("Companies heavily invested in the
subprime market will continue to face increased scrutiny by their shareholders and various
regulatory entities. Any future negative announcements from these entities will likely result
in the kind of stock price drop that regrettably triggers the filing of additional lawsuits.").
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recourse and defendants seek to fend off meritless lawsuits. As Judge
Easterbrook noted in Katz, "one or the other must yield. '389 This time, the
older statute, the '33 Act, should yield to the newer, CAFA; the past must
sometimes recede so that the present can rise.
Though the parallels to the Great Depression may call to memory some
of the historical purposes of the '33 Act in the context of the subprime
crisis, a plaintiffs absolute choice of forum in class actions is not the
optimum solution. A plaintiffs choice of forum has withstood the test of
time, and it does remain important for small individual investors, but
nationwide class actions implicating securities of national importance
should be heard in federal court.
Looking to the past is valuable, but it is not a panacea for the present ills
of the market. Perhaps the best cure for those suffering from the infirmities
of today's market is clear and consistent interpretation of the interplay
between CAFA and the '33 Act. This conflict is ripe for resolution. The
Seventh Circuit approach clarifies the false dichotomy between investor
protection and confidence. It honors the historical purposes and current
needs of the federal securities laws. Resolution of this conflict would allow
for clarity, consistency, and, finally, some class action fairness.
389. See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
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